HMRC's Management of the UK Tax System: The Boundaries of Legitimate Discretion by Freedman, Judith & Vella, John
HMRC’S MANAGEMENT OF THE UK
TAX SYSTEM: THE BOUNDARIES OF
LEGITIMATE DISCRETION
Judith Freedman
John Vella
OXFORD UNIVERSITY CENTRE FOR
BUSINESS TAXATION
SAI¨D BUSINESS SCHOOL, PARK END STREET
OXFORD OX1 1HP
WP 10/22
 1 
 
HMRC’s MANAGEMENT OF THE UK TAX SYSTEM: THE BOUNDARIES 
OF LEGITIMATE DISCRETION 
 
 
 
Draft 8th October 
Judith Freedman and John Vella* 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Taxation provides a critical point of contact between the individual and the state. It 
requires a number of delicate balances to be negotiated, ensuring, on the one hand, 
that the tax imposed by the legislature is collected in an effective and efficient manner 
and, on the other, that taxpayers’ rights and interests are respected. 
 
Whilst it is generally accepted that revenue authorities need to be able to employ 
some discretion in the exercise of their duties, much difficulty is encountered in 
agreeing on the breadth of discretion to be allowed. Indeed, the benefits of discretion, 
(including the smooth and efficient operation of the tax system, allowances for minor 
corrections and robust defences against attempts at manipulation by taxpayers) find a 
counterweight in strong demands from taxpayers for certainty, legitimacy, 
consistency and equality. The property and business interests involved in taxation 
lead some to suggest that certainty in tax law is of the utmost importance- perhaps 
even more so than in other areas of law. This view stems from a deep-seated notion, 
arising from a history of hard fought political battles, that taxation of property and 
labour is a form of legitimated property confiscation requiring powerful justification.1 
Even those who argue the contrary view, that all taxpayers can ever be entitled to is 
what they are left with after taxation,2
 
 would presumably agree that that taxation must 
be legitimately levied, according to the tests of legitimacy applicable in the relevant 
state.  
Taxpayer protection is guaranteed ultimately by the constitutional principles which 
underpin each national tax system. Debates on the amount of discretion that can be 
and ought to be vested in revenue authorities must thus take place against the 
background of each country’s specific constitutional principles. These principles will 
define the outer boundary of the discretion that may be allowed under that particular 
legal system. In the UK, in a revenue law context, these principles include the 
supremacy of Parliament and the rule of law, Article 4 of the Bill of Rights Act 1689 
which vests the sole authority to tax in Parliament, the Treaties of the European Union 
and principles deriving from them, to the extent that they are relevant in any given 
                                                 
*Professor of Taxation Law, University of Oxford and Director of Legal Research, Oxford Centre for 
Business Taxation and Senior Research Fellow, Oxford Centre for Business Taxation respectively. 
1 H. H. Monroe, Intolerable Inquisition Reflections on the Law of Tax (Stevens &Sons, 1981); R. 
Nozick, Anarchy , State and Utopia, (Blackwell Publishing,1974) at p. 169.  
2 L. Murphy and T. Nagel, The Myth of Ownership, (OUP, 2002) at p. 9. 
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case; the principles emerging out of the Human Rights Act 1998 and, potentially, the 
HMRC Charter. 3
 
  
HMRC’s discretion may be controlled by the courts in substantive cases which apply 
and interpret legislation and previous judicial decisions which have built up binding  
case law , through cases brought under the Human Rights Act 1998, which empowers 
the courts to strike down any exercise of power by a public authority that infringes the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(the European Convention)4
 
 and through the public law action for judicial review.    
 In order to evaluate the desirable amount of discretion to be vested in the revenue 
authority it is necessary to weigh up a number of factors, both competing and 
complimentary. These include the relevant constitutional principles (as these have 
been developed over many years to provide essential safeguards), efficiency, equity as 
between taxpayers, administrative resource constraints, compliance costs of 
taxpayers, risk of revenue loss and the international competitiveness of the tax system 
as a whole. This paper investigates the extent of the discretion vested in the UK on its 
tax authority, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in light of the relevant 
constitutional principles and the boundaries of that discretion   
 
This paper proceeds as follows. In part two it outlines and attempts to classify some 
different types of discretion employed by HMRC. In part three, the paper discusses in 
more detail the different constitutional principles governing the position. In part four 
it discusses the remedies available to the taxpayer in cases where there is a question of 
whether HMRC has exceeded its legitimate discretion. In part five, the authors 
analyse some topical and contentious examples of the use of discretion in relation to 
extra-statutory guidance and its application.  Part six concludes that there is indeed a 
delicate balance between the requirements of operational necessity on the one hand 
and the legitimacy of the functioning of the tax system on the other. There are 
valuable protections available to taxpayers through the courts but these are subject to 
many restrictions, expensive to pursue and can raise difficult procedural issues. At 
present there is also a lack of clarity around the nature and permissibility of different 
types of concession and their relationship with extra-statutory guidance, which may 
be in part interpretation and in part concessionary. If extra-statutory guidance is to 
play an increasing role in UK tax law, which seems likely especially given the move 
towards broadly drawn anti-avoidance provisions and principles based legislation, 
then it is desirable for a more explicit framework to be developed to ensure that an 
appropriate balance is maintained. A first step might be a strengthening of the HMRC 
Charter in this regard. 
 
 
 
2. HMRC AND ITS EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 
 
HMRC exercises its discretion - in the sense of making choices about when, how and 
                                                 
3 These concepts will be explored in more detail below. The HMRC Charter, introduced in section 92 
of the Finance Act 2009, can be found at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/charter/charter.pdf. As presently 
constituted it does not appear to give taxpayers any additional rights: see J. Whiting, “HMRC Charter – 
Magna Carta the second?”  [2009] BTR 616.  
4 Section 6 , Human Rights Act 1998.  
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to what extent to make a claim for tax - all the time. No tax system as complex as the 
one in the UK could possibility operate without scope for some judgement around 
these decisions. This section discusses some areas in which these types of application 
of choice or discretion are used at present and outlines the issues that have arisen as to 
that use. The limits on HMRC in this connection are investigated further, in their 
constitutional context, in section 3, which assesses the protection available to 
taxpayers in this respect.  
 
 
Responsibilities of HMRC 
 
 The functions of HMRC are set out in section 5 of the Commissioners for Revenue 
and Customs Act 2005 (CRCA), which vests HMRC with the responsibility for the 
“collection and management” of taxes. Section 9 then expands on this provision by 
giving HMRC the power to “do anything which they think (a) necessary or expedient 
in connection with the exercise of their functions, or (b) incidental or conducive to the 
exercise of their functions.”  
 
Section 51(3) of the CRCA provides that  
“A reference in this Act, in an enactment amended by this Act or, subject to express 
provision to the contrary, in any future enactment, to responsibility for collection and 
management of revenue has the same meaning as references to responsibility for care 
and management of revenue in enactments passed before this Act.” 
 
These words are designed to make clear that there was no intention to change the 
scope of the responsibility by the 2005 legislation, which was part of the Tax Law 
Rewrite project.5
 
  The wording of the legislation clearly gives HMRC considerable 
discretion but some limits have been applied by the case law and the previous case 
law still holds, unless overruled by subsequent cases or express statutory provisions. 
The limits imposed by the case law will be discussed below in this Part and further in 
Part 3 of this article. We shall start, however, by outlining some main areas in which 
discretion is utilised by HMRC and on which this article will focus. 
HMRC may be said to apply its discretion in the following categories of case.  
 
A. Discretion as to non-application of the law where its proper interpretation    is 
agreed.  
B. Discretion as to how to interpret the law. 
C. Discretion in management of  application of legislation and litigation 
D. Hybrids of categories A and B or of categories B and C. 
 
This paper will focus on the above categories and in particular on two cases studies 
which investigate the difficulties of hybrid discretions under D. There are other 
instances of the operation of HMRC discretion6
                                                 
5 Explanatory Notes to the CRCA 2005 at para. 46. 
 but this paper will confine itself to 
6 For example, HMRC may have some discretion to produce secondary legislation, or regulations. This 
must clearly be intra vires the power given by Parliament to produce this legislation. For example see  
R v IRC, ex parte  Woolwich Equitable Building Society [1987] STC 654. The Inland Revenue (as the 
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those above.  
 
 
A. Discretion as to non-application of the law where its proper interpretation is 
agreed.  
HMRC may decide not to enforce the law according to its agreed meaning. 
There are various ways in which it has done this in the past and the primary methods 
are:- 
 
i)    published extra-statutory concessions 
ii)  waivers or deals with individual taxpayers or groups of taxpayers on a one–off 
basis.  
 
 
i) 
Extra–statutory concessions have been controversial since they were first introduced, 
and the attacks on them were described in an article by David Williams in 1979.
Extra-statutory concessions 
7 He 
reports that the existence of these concessions was first reported to the Public 
Accounts Committee8 in 1897.  The Final Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Taxation of Income and Profit commented that it was ‘a little disconcerting to find the 
statute law being amended by this special and selective process’.9  The practice 
increased during the Second World War, but peace time did not see the withdrawal of 
this device.  Pressure resulted in an agreement to publish a list of extant concessions 
annually and this practice continues today. 10 The judiciary sometimes accepted 
concessions as facilitating the operation of the tax system in a useful way but some 
judges were considerably more critical. Lord Reid, for example, rejected a concession 
on the grounds that ‘administrative moderation … is no substitute for legal clarity and 
precision.’ 11
 
 
Williams questioned the practice of granting concessions and suggested that it was 
contrary to the ‘rule of law.’ He was commenting soon after a decision by Walton J in 
the case of Vestey v IRC,12 whose words “One should be taxed by law, and not be 
untaxed by concession” were echoed famously by Lord Wilberforce in a subsequent 
return of that case.13
 
  In fact that case concerned the use of unpublished administrative 
discretion to attempt to fill a gap in defective legislation and so did not necessarily 
outlaw the more established published extra-statutory discretions. 
 Since then there have been further clarifications regarding the scope of concessions 
which may be granted, most notably by the House of Lords in Wilkinson v IRC.14
                                                                                                                                           
tax authority was then called) was held to have exceeded its powers in Regulations but Parliament 
subsequently  enacted legislation o the same effect. For further discussion see S. Eden, “A tax on all 
blue-eyed persons” in M.Greggi (ed) Bridging the Sea (forthcoming).  
 This 
7 D. Williams, “Extra-Statutory Concessions”, [1979] BTR 137. 
8 This is a Committee of the House of Commons that still exists today.  
9 Cmd. 9474, para 240, cited in Williams op. cit. at p. 137. 
10 The August 2009 list may be found at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/specialist/esc.pdf 
11 Bates v IRC [1969] AC 483,500 cited by Williams op. cit. at p.141.  
12 [1979] Ch. 177, 197. 
13 Vestey v IRC [1980] A.C. 1148. This case, and in particular Lord Wilberforce’s comments, are discussed 
in some detail further on below. 
14 R v IRC, ex parte Wilkinson [2005] UKHL 30 per Lord Hoffmann paras. 20-23 
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case has caused HMRC to review all its concessions and to commence a programme 
of withdrawing some and legislating others that fall outside the scope of its discretion 
according to the views outlined by Lord Hoffmann.15
 
  
In Wilkinson Lord Hoffmann agreed with the well known statement of Lord Diplock 
in IRC v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd16
 
 that  
HMRC were granted "a wide managerial discretion as to the best means of obtaining 
for the national exchequer from the taxes committed to their charge, the highest net 
return that is practicable having regard to the staff available to them and the cost of 
collection."  
He then continued:  
 
“[t]his discretion enables the commissioners to formulate policy in the 
interstices of the tax legislation, dealing pragmatically with minor or transitory 
anomalies, cases of hardship at the margins or cases in which a statutory rule is 
difficult to formulate or its enactment would take up a disproportionate amount 
of parliamentary time… [i]t does not justify construing the power so widely as 
to enable the commissioners to concede, by extra-statutory concession, an 
allowance which Parliament could have granted but did not grant…” 
 
This marks an outer limit beyond which concessions are ultra vires but presents us 
with a serious problem when it comes to the extent to which concessions can be 
binding on HMRC under the doctrine of legitimate expectation discussed in section 3 
below. Under this doctrine a court may, through the medium of a public law remedy, 
judicial review, hold HMRC to be bound by a concessions and relaxations of 
enforcement procedures in some circumstances. The question of whether this applies 
in a case where it is outside the powers of HMRC to grant such a concession is one to 
which we shall return in part 4 below. 
 
HMRC’s current list of concessions states that:  
 
“An Extra-Statutory Concession is a relaxation which gives taxpayers a reduction 
in tax liability to which they would not be entitled under the strict letter of the 
law. Most concessions are made to deal with what are, on the whole, minor or 
transitory anomalies under the legislation and to meet cases of hardship at the 
margins of the code where a statutory remedy would be difficult to devise or 
would run to a length out of proportion to the intrinsic importance of the matter. 
 
The concessions described within are of general application, but it must be borne 
in mind that in a particular case there may be special circumstances which will 
need to be taken into account in considering the application of the concession. A 
concession will not be given in any case where an attempt is made to use it for tax 
                                                 
15 Treasury orders (secondary legislation) to enact concessions can be introduced under a power in 
section 160 of Finance Act 2008. Several documents discussing the withdrawal or enactment of 
concessions are now on the HMRC website. Many concessions are considered to be valid under the 
Wilkinson test and these will be retained. Where concessions are withdrawn and not enacted it is stated 
on the website that an appropriate period of notice will be given to allow taxpayers to review their 
affairs and there will be no retrospective effect of any change. It is questionable whether this can be 
binding in view of the above discussion. 
16 [1981] STC 260 (HL)   
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avoidance.”17
 
  
The two points to note here is that it continues to be assumed that a valid concession may 
go beyond the law and that there is a major let out clause for HMRC in cases of 
“avoidance”- avoidance itself being a somewhat difficult term to define. This clearly 
impacts on the value of the concession, as we shall see below.  
 
 
ii) 
In addition to generalised concessions, HMRC has a settled discretion within its 
powers of management under section 5 CRCA to reach agreements with individual 
taxpayers or groups of taxpayers. This was firmly established in Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd
Waivers and deals  
18 
and indeed it can easily be seen that without the ability to settle cases and decide 
whether to pursue particular issues it is not possible to run a tax system in a sensible 
way. The National Federation of Self-Employed case permitted the Inland Revenue, 
as it then was, to come to an agreement with unions and employers concerning a 
group of workers, wiping out past tax liabilities incurred as a result of evasion on the 
condition of future co-operation. The tax was probably impossible to collect in any 
event but this waiver was challenged as unreasonable by a group representing small 
businesses. The case made clear that there was no rule of equality in tax treatment that 
prevented such a deal in the UK and the majority also held that other taxpayers, 
including the small business group, had no locus to bring the case.  In R v IRC, ex p 
MFK 19, relying on the earlier case of Preston20
 
, the court confirmed that if the 
revenue authority agreed to forgo tax which might arguably be payable on a proper 
construction of the relevant legislation, it could be held to that representation under 
the doctrine of legitimate expectation developed as part of judicial review (discussed 
in Part 4 below) provided the taxpayer had made full disclosure.  
There are limits to this, however, as shown in the case of Al Fayed.21
 
 There are some 
deals which are ultra vires and therefore, it would seem, cannot bind the revenue 
authority. An unlawful use of its discretion cannot bind the revenue authority. The 
problem is to know what is unlawful, since it is permissible to forgo tax that might 
otherwise be collected in some a case like MFK but not in Al Fayed, where it was 
held that the Revenue had no power to contract with a taxpayer as to his future tax 
liability. This is discussed further in Part 4 below.  
 
B. Discretion as to how to interpret the law. 
It is clearly ultimately for the courts to decide on the proper meaning and application 
of legislation, but in practice there is considerable scope for  HMRC to opine on the 
meaning of legislation. Unless and until HMRC’s view is challenged in the courts it is 
likely that many taxpayers will rely on the HMRC interpretation and this is therefore 
a very powerful tool. The following devices are utilised:- 
i) statements of practice, interpretations and press releases 
                                                 
17 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/specialist/esc.pdf 
18 [1981] 2 W.L.R. 722. 
19 [1989] STC 896, 
20 [1985] STC 282 
21 Al Fayed v Advocate General for Scotland [2004] STC 1.  
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ii) guidance booklets and guidance statements 
iii) manuals written initially for revenue staff  
iv) statutory and non-statutory clearances 
 
These various statements may be used to give a view on new legislation or areas 
where uncertainties and difficulties have arisen. They are often used to fill in the gaps 
where the legislation is drafted in broad terms, especially in the case of anti-avoidance 
legislation or where a term is used that is not defined in the legislation. There is 
increasing use of guidance in view of the desire to legislate in a broad fashion to 
escape the problems of complexity in legislation leading to creative compliance.
i)- iii) Statements of Practice, guidance and manuals.  
22 At 
present this guidance is completely outside the legislative system as it is not contained 
in regulations (secondary legislation) but is simply issued by HMRC.23
 
 As with extra-
statutory concessions, and as discussed further below, published guidance is often   
qualified by caveats and may be very general in nature. The impact of those caveats 
on the value of the guidance is discussed further below.  
Sometimes the guidance published by HMRC contains an element of concession – 
that is categories A and B overlap. Given the indeterminacy of tax law the distinction 
between interpretation and the giving of a concession can be hard to discern. If there 
is a concessionary element there may the be a question mark over whether the  
guidance can found a legitimate expectation and this will be discussed further in 
ration to the Gaines-Copper case in part 5.  
 
HMRC also publishes manuals, primarily for the guidance of its own staff. These are 
now published on the internet, however, and have become a valuable and popular 
starting place for practitioners researching tax questions. This is now encouraged by 
HMRC and they are beginning to put certain forms of guidance directly into the 
manuals, where they expect taxpayers and their advisers to consult them. The manuals 
raise many of the same questions as published guidance. In addition they are 
frequently amended, and this can give rise to real difficulties in keeping track of 
changes, since amendments are not marked on the face of the amended manual and 
the old version is removed from the HMRC website.  
 
iv) 
There is no general system of clearances or rulings in the UK, although some 
legislative provisions contain specific clearance application provisions.
Clearances  
24
For business customers there is a more extensive clearance service described on the 
HMRC website.
 Unless such 
a specific provision is included the taxpayer may apply for clearances only in limited 
circumstances, at present. These are set out in Code of Practice 10 for general 
customers.  
25
                                                 
22 See Part 5 below.   
 For this group, HMRC aims to provide clearances on areas of 
material uncertainty arising within four Finance Acts of the introduction of any new 
legislation  and on legislation older than last four Finance Acts where there is material 
23 See the discussions of the guidance on residence and the guidance on section 16A of the Taxation of 
Chargeable Gains Act 1992 discussed in Part 5 below.  
24 For example section 748 Corporation Tax Act 20101 (transactions in securities). 
25 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/cap/links-dec07.htm 
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uncertainty around the tax outcome of a real issue of commercial significance to the 
business itself, determined by reference to the scale of the business and the impact of 
the issue upon it . The website states that  
“Clearances do not alter the tax treatment but simply give you HMRC's view of what 
the correct tax treatment is.” 
Non-statutory clearances under this  practice are therefore not binding on HMRC in a 
strict sense but would bind HMRC under the  doctrine of legitimate expectation 
provided the taxpayer fell squarely within the clearance given and had made all the  
facts and details clear to HMRC under the MFK doctrine, discussed above.  
 
 
C.      Discretion in management of application of legislation and litigation 
(i) Codes of Practice are used by HMRC that set out the way in which they 
will conduct investigations and enquiries, when and how it will offer 
advice and provide information and how it will conduct consultations on 
proposed changes to the law.26  There is also a litigation and settlements 
strategy which guides the way in which disputes are dealt with.27
 
 
The Codes of Practice create self-imposed duties on HMRC but in some cases also 
mean that they will apply their discretion, for example by not exacting the full penalty 
available under the law where voluntary disclosure of irregularities is made. 
Discretion is also applied as to when to pursue a case through the courts and when to 
settle.  
 
(ii) Resource allocation and risk rating are management tools which may 
employ a degree of discretion.  Resource allocation is very clearly 
recognised to be the central area where HMRC needs to have scope to 
manage in a cost efficient way.28
 
 
HMRC may decide the level of resource to devote to any given taxpayer in 
scrutinizing tax returns and making enquiries. There is an increasing (and entirely 
sensible) tendency to base such decisions on profiling of taxpayers and risk-rating.29 
In relation to large businesses, for example, this has been formalized in the UK in a 
risk rating process which categorises each business as being low risk or not and 
deciding on its treatment accordingly.30
                                                 
26 The  Codes of Practice can be found at 
 The process of assigning the risk rating 
involves the application of criteria the devising of which can itself be a process 
involving the application of discretion, since the consequences of categorization can 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/leaflets/c11.htm 
27 HMRC Litigation and Settlements Strategy – this can be found at   
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/practitioners/lss-intro.htm 
28 Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd 
[1981] 2 W.L.R. 722. 
29 This is a worldwide trend- see for example Fiscalis Risk Management Platform Group, Compliance 
Risk Management Guide for Tax Administrations,  (European Commission, 2010) 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/publications/info_docs/taxation/ris
k_managt_guide_en.pdf 
30  HMRC, Tax Compliance Risk Management Process (May 2009), (TCRM) available at: 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/tcrmanual/index.htm (accessed August 29, 2010). 
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be considerable.  Categorization has been used quite explicitly to influence the 
behaviour of the taxpayer. In some documents there are suggestions that HMRC will 
only allocate a low risk rating to taxpayers who do not challenge HMRC’s 
interpretation of the law or even those who use acknowledge loopholes or anomalies 
in the law.31 In this way, risk rating, whilst initially appearing to be a purely 
administrative device can become a significant application of discretion, even going 
so far as to attempt to influence taxpayers to be over-complaint. 32
 
 
 
D. Hybrids of categories A and B or of categories B and C. 
Where a discretion as to how to manage resources or interpret legislation is interlaced 
with concessionary treatment we have a hybrid of the above categories. The 
concession may be an integral part of the treatment applied by HMRC and may be a 
deliberate relaxation or simply the unintended consequence of a particular 
interpretation.  If the validity of the concessionary part of guidance is in question, 
however, then this might undermine the guidance entirely.  Both the case studies in 
section 5 explore this issue in more detail.  
 
 
 
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON HMRC DISCRETION 
 
This part provides some constitutional background to the analysis. In particular, it 
examines the constitutional principles which determine that amount of discretion 
which can be vested in HMRC.  
 
The Framework Dictated by the Supremacy of Parliament Principle  
We start by examining the constitutional principles which determine how much 
discretion may be granted to HMRC by legislation. The traditional starting point to 
answering this question is the doctrine of supremacy of parliament principle. 
According to this principle parliament enjoys “the right to make or unmake any law 
whatever: and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of England as 
having a right to override or set aside the legislation of parliament.”33
                                                 
31 See TCRM ibid.  The Assessment Indicators in Annex B include the significant use of loopholes or 
anomalies in the law to minimise taxes or duties, yet these may be based on an agreed correct 
interpretation of the law. Also included as  indicators of high risk are frequent tax planning that 
requires disclosure to HMRC or innovative interpretation of tax law; choice of analysis because it has 
the most tax-advantageous potential outcome and regular submission of  requests for clearances or 
making of voluntary disclosures which are not in accordance with HMRC guidance . 
 It follows that, 
32 Another example of this approach is the Code of Practice on Taxation of Banks 
http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/channelsPortalWebApp.portal?_nfpb=true&_page
Label=pageVAT_ShowContent&propertyType=document&columns=1&id=HMCE_PROD1_030008. 
This was to have been introduced in December 2009 although as it is voluntary and not statutory there 
is no information available about its take up rate.  It states that “the Government expects that banking 
groups, their subsidiaries, and their branches operating in the UK, will comply with the spirit, as well 
as the letter, of tax law, discerning and following the intentions of Parliament”. For further discussion 
see J. Freedman, “Tax Risk Management and Corporate Taxpayers - International Tax Administration 
Developments” in A. Bakker and S. Kloosterhof (eds) Tax Risk Management. From Risk to 
Opportunity (IBFD, 2010). 
33 A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution – first published in 1885 in 
London by Macmillan. Bradley and Ewing have explained that “…in the United Kingdom the 
legislative supremacy of Parliament appears to be the fundamental rule of constitutional law and this 
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theoretically at least, any law may be enacted by means of a simple majority in 
Parliament, including a law that accords extremely broad discretionary powers to the 
revenue authorities. Any law or even constitutional principle which stands in the way 
of conferring such discretion, including the Bill of Rights Act 1689,34 the Rule of 
Law, the Human Rights Act 1998 or even, ultimately, in theory at least, any aspect of 
EU Law,35 may be overcome by a simple Act of Parliament.36
 
 
The above analysis follows the traditional understanding of the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy. Some senior judges have intimated that this doctrine would 
need to be revisited in extreme situations.37 This suggests that UK courts might 
intervene if, for example, a statute breaches the rule of law in an extreme fashion. 
Whilst this would be considered a fairly uncontroversial and unremarkable process in 
many jurisdictions, so deeply entrenched is the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy 
within the British constitutional system that fellow senior judges and commentators 
have dismissed this possibility out of hand.38
 
 
The supremacy of parliament principle thus dominates the constitutional landscape in 
the UK. A law which simply states “HMRC may determine the tax to be collected 
from individuals” would thus be legal albeit “unconstitutional” in the sense that it 
contravenes well established constitutional principles.39
 
 Such a law might require the 
specific repeal of Acts such as the Bill of Rights Act 1689 and the Human Rights Act 
1998, but this may be done by the mere expedient of an Act of Parliament passed by 
simple majority.  
The overpowering strength of the supremacy of parliament principle might seem to 
leave the other relevant constitutional principles, which we discuss in 3.1.2. and 
which what we may refer as the “remaining constitutional principles” for ease of 
reference , with little room to protect taxpayers. Whilst true in theory, this is less so in 
practice. Indeed, these constitutional principles in practice protect taxpayers in two 
important ways.  
                                                                                                                                           
supremacy includes power to legislate on constitutional matters. In so far as constitutional rules are 
contained in earlier Act, there seems to be no Act which Parliament could not repeal or amend by 
passing a new Act. The Bill of Rights of 1689 could in law be repealed or amended by an ordinary Act 
of Parliament.” Bradley and Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 14th ed., (Longman, 2008) 
at p. 57.   
34 Note that article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 was amended by section 13 of the Defamation Act 
1996.  
35 EU Law represents a special case and shall be discussed further on. The point here is that if any 
aspect of EU Law were to stand in the way of Parliament, Parliament could ultimately repeal the 
European Communities Act 1972 and take the necessary steps, all by means of a simple Act of 
Parliament, to end the UK’s membership of the EU, although since this involves international treaties 
and institutions this would obviously be very complex in practice.   
36 On the European Communities Act 1972 see Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195, 
[2003] QB 151; on the Human Rights Act 1998 see Watkins v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department and others, [2006] UKHL 17, [2006] 2 A.C. 395. 
37 See Lord Woolf, ‘Droit Public – English Style’, [1995] PL 57; Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board 
[1984] 1 NZLR 394 at 398 per Lord Cooke and R (Jackson) v A-G [2005] UKHL 56 at [102] per Lord 
Steyn.  
38 Lord Bingham, “The rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament”, KLJ 2008, 19(2), 223. See also 
Richard Ekins, ‘Acts of Parliament and the Parliament Acts’, LQR 2007, 123(Jan), 91-115 and  J. 
Goldsworthy, “Is Parliament Sovereign? Recent Challenges to the Doctrine of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty” (2005) 3 New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 7. 
39 Bradley and Ewing, op. cit. at p. 26. 
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Firstly, the “principle of legality” enjoins courts to interpret statutes in a manner that 
ensures compatibility with basic constitutional rights and principles, unless these are 
overridden by express language or clear and necessary implication.40 This is an 
interpretative presumption which allows courts to depart from the natural meaning of 
the statute in order to ensure compatibility with such constitutional rights and 
principles, unless legislation expressly or by clear and necessary implication runs 
counter to them.41   Lord Rodger explained that courts employ this presumption 
“because the substance of the rule is perceived to be so important that Parliament 
must squarely confront what it is doing when it interferes with it and must accept the 
political cost.”42 In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p. Simms Lord 
Steyn described the principle of legality as a constitutional principle and it has been 
held to apply to both constitutional principles arising from the common law, as well 
as those arising from statutes, such as the Bill of Rights 1689.43
 
 As shall be seen 
further on, a stronger version of the principle of legality applies in the context of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. The principle of legality is one that comes into play when 
courts are asked, by means of an application for judicial review, to determine whether 
a particular act by HMRC exceeded the vires conferred upon them by widely drafted 
discretionary powers. The principle of legality will enjoin a court to narrow the ambit 
of the discretion if necessary to ensure conformity with the remaining constitutional 
principles. 
 The remaining constitutional principles also protect taxpayers in a second way. 
Although they can be breached by a simple Act of Parliament with no apparent 
redress being available, serious breaches of these principles would rouse political 
clamour, meaning that politicians have a vested interest in treading carefully in such 
areas. Egregious breaches could lead to a potentially fatal political backlash and are 
thus less likely to arise. More subtle breaches of these principles do not raise such 
clamour, however, and thus constitute a real and pernicious possibility. This makes it 
all the more important to identify the boundary established by these principles in a 
clear a fashion as possible. If they are to be breached, this should be done knowingly 
and on the back of reasoned consideration.  
 
Before leaving the topic of Parliamentary sovereignty is should be noted that it might 
at first appear strange to assert Parliamentary sovereignty in a system where the 
doctrine of judicial precedent plays such a strong role. This is, however, entirely 
consistent with the notion of Parliamentary  sovereignty since the role of the judges is 
to ascertain the intention of Parliament . Naturally if Parliament dislikes any  resulting 
interpretation it may pass amending legislation - thus the sovereignty is maintained - 
in theory at least.   
 
 Other Constitutional Principles 
The conclusion reached in the previous section is that whilst the UK Parliament may 
enact any law by means of a simple majority, including one that confers untold 
                                                 
40 P. Sales, ‘A comparison of the principle of legality and section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1988’  
[2009] LQR 598. 
41 Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Pierson [1998] A.C. 539.  
42 Watkins v Secretary of State for the Home Department and others, [2006] UKHL 17, [2006] 2 A.C. 
395. 
43 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195, [2003] QB 151. 
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discretion upon HMRC, in practice political considerations and constitutional 
principles do provide protection for taxpayers. The two main constitutional principles 
that are of interest for our purpose are Article 4 of the Bill of Rights 1689 (“Article 
4”) and the rule of law. The Human Rights Act 1998 and EU law place further 
limitations on the conferral of discretionary power on HMRC. We can look at each in 
turn.  
 
Article 4 of the Bill of Rights 168944
 
 
Article 4 provides:  
 
“That levying money for or to the use of the Crown by pretence of 
prerogative, without grant of Parliament, for longer time, or in other manner 
than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal” 
Article 4 is a potent constitutional principle. It has been used by courts and has had an 
important effect in a variety of contexts. Article 4 was invoked to show that the courts 
could not have developed a judicial anti-avoidance rule.45 This constitutional 
principle, the judges argued, would be violated by a judicial anti-avoidance rule, as 
this would be tantamount to tax being imposed by the courts rather than Parliament. 
The anti-avoidance rule that had appeared to surface and take shape from Ramsay46 
onwards was thus recast as an instance of statutory interpretation. Article 4 played an 
equally decisive role in the creation of a remedy in restitution for tax paid under an 
ultra vires demand. In Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue,47 Lord Goff held that full effect can only be given to the principle 
enshrined in Article 4, “if the return of taxes exacted under an unlawful demand can 
be enforced as a matter of right”.48 Furthermore, this principle has been expanded to 
cover cases in which tax or other levy has been wrongly exacted by the public 
authority not because the demand was ultra vires but also if the authority has 
misconstrued a relevant statute or regulation.49
 
 This potent constitutional principle 
can thus both curtail or assist the development of a judge-made rule.  
                                                 
44 An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown 
1688 c.2 1_Will_and_Mar_Sess_2 (known as The Bill of Rights) emerged from the “Glorious 
Revolution” of 1688-89, which culminated in the exile of King James II and the accession to the throne 
of William of Orange and Mary. Its intentions were: to depose James II for misgovernment; to 
determine the succession to the Throne; to curb future arbitrary behaviour of the monarch; and to 
guarantee parliament’s powers vis a vis the Crown, thereby establishing a constitutional monarchy- see 
House of Commons Library note SN/PC/0293 (2009)  
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-00293.pdf 
45 MacNiven v. Westmoreland [2001] UKHL 6, [2001] S.T.C. 237, at [29] per Lord Hoffmann and The 
Collector of Stamp Revenue v. Arrowtown Assets Limited [2003] HKCFA 46, at [105] per Lord Millett. 
46 WT Ramsay  Ltd v IRC [1981] STC 174 
47 [1993] AC 70. 
48 In the case Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), 2007 SCC 1, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3. 
the Canadian Supreme Court held that the unjust enrichment analysis is ill-suited to deal with the issues 
raised by ultra vires taxes. Instead, it argued that in such a case taxpayers have recourse to a remedy as 
a matter of constitutional right. The constitutional principle relied upon by the Canadian Supreme 
Court as a basis for this remedy, enshrined in sections 53 and 90 of the Constitution Act 1867, is 
similar to Article 4. 
49 See Lord Goff obiter dictum in Woolwich  which seems to have been accepted in British Steel plc v 
Customs and Excise Comrs [1997] 2 All E.R. 366.  
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Article 4 has also been determinative in dealing with questions which are nearer to 
that under consideration in the present section. In A-G v Wilts United Dairies Ltd50  
and Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Cure & Deeley Ltd51
 
 Article 4, in 
conjunction with the principle of legality, allowed the court to find that a statutory 
provision delegating power to an administrative agency could not be deemed to have 
included the power to raise taxes. If Parliament intended to empower administrative 
agencies to impose taxes, counter to the constitutional principle embodied in Article 
4, it must do so expressly.  As this was not done in these two cases the court 
concluded that the power was not implied and, therefore, the imposition of taxes by 
the agencies was ultra vires. Article 4 therefore clearly protects against the self-
arrogation of taxing power by the executive. 
Article 4 thus remains an important principle of British constitutional law. The 
question we must now ask is how it affects the conferment of discretionary powers 
upon HMRC. Would the principle be breached if a considerable amount of discretion 
were to be vested expressly in HMRC as this would be tantamount to tax being 
imposed by a body other than Parliament? Or would the fact that the power is vested 
in HMRC by Parliament itself satisfy Article 4? We can start by considering an 
extreme case. A law which simply stated “HMRC may, at its discretion, determine the 
tax to be collected from individuals” might be thought to be in line, technically, with 
Article 4 as the taxing power vested in HMRC would be granted by means of an Act 
of Parliament. The principle of legality would mean that the courts would do all they 
could to interpret such a power as narrowly as possible but ultimately, the fact 
remains that the supremacy of parliament doctrine would ensure that such a law, as 
long as it is expressed in clear and unequivocal language would have to be respected 
by the courts. 
 
Less extreme cases present greater difficulty. We can start by considering how the 
general managerial discretion conferred upon HMRC by section 5 of the 
Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 might be narrowed by the 
principle of legality to ensure conformity with Article 4. The principle of legality 
might  narrow this provision by excluding discretionary powers which are tantamount 
to tax being imposed by HMRC rather than Parliament. Whilst it is clear that HMRC 
should not seek to collect taxes that are not imposed by statute, what tax a statute 
actually imposes is often less clear. Indeed, it is often the case that two (or more) 
tenable interpretations exist, according to one of which a transaction is taxed, and 
according to another it is not.52
 
 In that situation, HMRC should of course be free to 
pursue the interpretation that it prefers. If, however, both alternatives are based on 
arguable cases, it would seem to be outside the discretion of HMRC to decide that one 
of those interpretations is ‘unacceptable’  and not the view of Parliament, since this a  
matter for the courts to ascertain, as explained above. 
It follows from the above that limitations are equally placed by Article 4 on 
Discretion C – namely the discretion in the management of the application of 
legislation and litigation. The reasoning made thus far implies that Article 4 narrows 
                                                 
50 (1921) 37 TLR 884 confirmed on appeal by the House of Lords (1922) 38 TLR 781. 
51 [1962] 1 Q.B. 340. 
52 One ought not to forget that eminent members of the judiciary have frequently disagreed on the 
interpretation of a taxing provision and hence the outcome of a tax dispute.  
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HMRC’s discretion here. Whilst demanding tax based on a tenable interpretation of 
the law is obviously within HMRC’s powers, imposing costs on taxpayers who 
choose to follow an interpretation of the law that is tenable but different to that held 
by HMRC is not, although of course if HMRC  decides to litigate the case to test its 
views that is a different matter. But simple declarations of an interpretation do not 
establish that this is the law and so should not be used to penalize the taxpayer who 
disagrees with the declaration on reasonable grounds.  
 
A second and equally difficult issue arises in the context of provisions which do not 
vest HMRC with broad discretionary powers yet are worded so broadly that they 
require considerable discretion by HMRC to be applied. Does Article 4 affect these 
provisions? Could they ever be deemed to be so broad as to require de facto 
legislation by HMRC contrary to Article 4? We are, once again, here dealing with 
Discretions A, B and C. One might think that Parliamentary Supremacy dictates that 
courts must always interpret such a provision as vesting HMRC with the discretion 
necessary to give effect to it or that HMRC’s general discretion would empower it to 
give effect to the provision. In Vestey v IRC,53
 
 Lord Wilberforce suggested otherwise.  
Vestey concerned assessments to tax made upon beneficiaries under a discretionary 
trust. The relevant statutory provision was so broadly drawn that interpreted strictly it 
arguably allowed HMRC to assess a single beneficiary on the basis of the total 
income of the settlement in the year of apportionment of the capital sums, and this 
regardless of the amount of benefit actually received by him.54 HMRC argued that in 
such cases they have a discretion which enables them to assess one or more or all of 
the individuals in such sums as they think fit, the only limitation upon this discretion 
being that the total income may not be assessed more than once. Lord Wilberforce 
described this as “a remarkable contention.”55
 
 He also stated: 
“Taxes are imposed upon subjects by Parliament. A citizen cannot be taxed 
unless he is designated in clear terms by a taxing Act as a taxpayer and the 
amount of his liability is clearly defined. A proposition that whether a subject 
is to be taxed or not, or, if he is, the amount of his liability, is to be decided 
(even though within a limit) by an administrative body represents a radical 
departure from constitutional principle. It may be that the revenue could 
persuade Parliament to enact such a proposition in such terms that the courts 
would have to give effect to it: but, unless it has done so, the courts, acting on 
constitutional principles, not only should not, but cannot, validate it. 
 
The commissioners have, I gladly accept, done their best to devise a system 
which is workable and reasonably fair. But whatever system they might devise 
lacks any legal basis. I must regard this case therefore as one in which 
Parliament has attempted to impose a tax, but in which it has failed, in the case 
of discretionary beneficiaries, to lay down any basis on which it can be 
assessed or levied. In the absence of any such basis the tax must fail.”56
                                                 
53 [1980] A.C. 1148. 
 
54 See p. 1193. 
55 At p. 1171.  
56 Note also that Lord Wilberforce states that if the correct interpretation of the section is that argued 
for by HMRC he would conclude “that no method for levying the tax in such cases has been prescribed 
by Parliament, that this gap cannot be filled by administrative decision and the assessments of it fail.” 
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Lord Wilberforce does not mention Article 4 expressly but his sentiments reflect its 
contents. Whilst the supremacy of parliament means that Parliament can enact statutes 
which require a large degree of discretion to be exercised by HMRC and courts must 
validate them, it must do so in clear and unequivocal terms. If the laws are not clear in 
conferring this discretion onto HMRC courts will simply assume that Parliament did 
not intend overturning Article 4. Interestingly, Lord Wilberforce was unwilling to 
interpret HMRC’s general discretion as including discretion to give effect to this 
statutory provision or to interpret the relevant statutory provision as implying the 
necessary discretion to give effect to it. The presumption that Parliament would not 
want to overturn Article 4 is too strong to allow either. Before doing so, Lord 
Wilberforce was prepared to simply find that the statutory provision “failed”.57
 
 
This leaves open the task of determining how much discretion a provision requires for 
its application before it runs into the problems faced by the provision in Vestey. Or, 
viewed from a different perspective, how vague can a taxing provision be? This is 
clearly a matter which ought to be taken into consideration when designing new tax 
legislation. If a provision requires discretion of the proportions discussed in Vestey, it 
is necessary to ensure that Parliament vests HMRC in a clear and unequivocal manner 
with the discretion necessary to apply it unless it is to run the risk of being deemed by 
a court to have “failed”. Of course, it is not altogether apparent from Lord 
Wilberforce speech how “clear” a conferment of discretion on HMRC need to be. In 
any event, the provision at issue in Vestey was pretty extreme. Crucially, it provided 
no indication on how HMRC ought to be narrow its application in practice. We must 
thus conclude that a provision would have to necessitate a remarkable amount of 
discretion before it could be deemed to have “failed” on these grounds.  
 
 
The Rule of Law 
The rule of law is generally viewed as one of the main pillars of the British 
Constitution.58 That said, it has been interpreted in different ways by constitutional 
experts as well as legal philosophers, and, in keeping with this trend, no definition 
was attempted when it made its first appearance in a statute in 2005.59
 
 
One of the earliest proponents of the rule of law was Dicey in his Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution.60 His definition of the rule of law is in part 
contentious but his inclusion of the absence of arbitrariness, in that government 
should govern by known rules rather than by whim or discretion, is widely accepted.61 
Tomkins argues that in English public law the rule of law has at its core a simple and 
clear meaning - that the executive may do nothing without clear legal authority first 
permitting its actions. This can be seen as the basis of the legal principle of judicial 
review, discussed below. 62
                                                                                                                                           
(at p. 1179).      
 
57 See also Customs and Excise Commissioners v Top Ten Promotions Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1163. 
58  See A. V. Dicey, op. cit.   
59 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s.1.which states that the Act does not adversely affect— 
(a) the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law, or (b)the Lord Chancellor's existing 
constitutional role in relation to that principle. 
60 Op. Cit. 
61 A. Tomkins, Public Law, (OUP, 2003), at p. 22.  
62  Ibid.  p. 78. 
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The legal philosopher Raz puts forward a slightly different formalist conception of the 
rule of law and argues that  the basic intuition from which the rule of law  doctrine 
derives is “the law must be capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects”.63
 
 A 
number of principles follow from this concept, which Raz, Fuller and others have 
suggested over the years. The principles that are directly relevant to the issue 
discussed in this paper appear fairly uncontroversial and the first overlaps with the 
public law concept described above. That is that the lives of individuals should be 
governed by law and not by administrative discretion.  
The other principles expounded by Raz include, more generally, that the law should 
be clear enough to allow individuals to regulate their affairs in advance. Thirdly, the 
exercise of governmental authority directly affecting individual interests must rest on 
legitimate foundations.64
 
 Fourthly, the final determination of the meaning of law 
should be made by an independent third party. This last principle requires some 
elaboration. If a law were to be interpreted by its drafter, he might give it a meaning 
that is in line with his subjective intention in drafting it, but which cannot be apparent 
to anyone else upon reading the legislation. Therefore, individuals would not be able 
to regulate their affairs in advance, as demanded by the rule of law, because they 
would not have access to the meaning of the law as it will be eventually interpreted by 
the drafter.  
Whilst fairly uncontroversial, these principles derived from the rule of law do not 
provide precise prescription. Take the first two principles noted above. A law stating  
“HMRC may, at its discretion, determine the tax to be collected from individuals” 
would clearly breach the first two principles dictated by the rule of law. Under such a 
law individuals’ lives would be governed by discretion and not law, and its lack of 
clarity would not allow individuals to regulate their affairs in advance. On the other 
hand, it is well understood that some administrative discretion is not only useful but 
desirable, and that some vagueness in law is unavoidable. 65
 
 
To this extent it would appear that the rule of law will primarily serve as a general 
guide on the framework the tax system should follow and aspire to and to protect 
against serious breaches. It will be used less frequently in calibrating specific aspects 
of the tax system such as the amount of discretion that ought to be vested in HMRC or 
how general the wording of a law may be. On the other hand, situations may arise 
when it provides specific prescription and where, a court interprets HMRC’s general 
discretionary powers to be narrowed or affected by rule of law considerations. We can 
take a situation which is currently causing some controversy as an example.  
 
Some recent initiatives by HMRC, such as risk rating for large businesses66 and  a 
Code of Practice for Banks67
                                                 
63 J. Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’, reprinted in The Authority of Law, 2nd ed., (OUP, 2009), at 
p. 214.  
 seek to change attitudes towards tax avoidance by  
64 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 1(1) (2001 Reissue)  
65 T. Endicott, “The impossibility of the rule of law” [1991] Oxford Journal Legal Studies 19(1). 
66 See the discussion under the introduction to category C in Part 2 above.  
67 HMRC, A Code of Practice on Taxation for Banks, December 2009 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/pbr2009/tax-banks-supp-0040.pdf   It is believed that few if any banks have 
actually signed up to this but it indicates the  way in which HMRC is attempting to exert pressure  on 
taxpayers to alter their behaviour. 
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putting pressure on taxpayers to  follow what HMRC consider to be the ‘spirit’ of the 
law, even though this may not be  the way in which the courts would interpret the 
legislation in question. These can be criticized as potentially undermining the rule of 
law. If HMRC attempts to impose its view of what is acceptable, even if there is an 
alternative tenable interpretation of the law, then arguably they are going further than 
pure interpretation and management and so are exceeding their clear legal authority.68 
This concern was raised in connection with the Bank Code by the Financial Markets 
Law Committee. 69
 
  
Of course it is true that the taxpayer may always appeal to the courts in such a case, 
but the aim of HMRC is to impose ‘persuade’ the taxpayer to pay tax according to 
HMRC’s view of the law without having to deal with the matter through the courts, 
by increasing the cost and burden of those taxpayers choosing to adopt their own 
interpretation of the law, even though that might be an arguable interpretation.  There 
is a point here at which reasonable management of the tax system may tip over into an 
unwarranted attempt to act without clear legal authority..   
 
 
Human Rights Act 1998 
A major part of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was 
incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998. The Supremacy of 
Parliament principle however means that a domestic court may not strike down 
primary legislation which contravenes the ECHR. Instead protection through the 
courts is afforded by means of three other mechanisms. Firstly, domestic courts will 
try to interpret legislation consistently with the ECHR.70 As noted, this is similar to 
the principle of legality but stronger, in that courts can go even further in interpreting 
statutes to ensure conformity with the ECHR.71 Secondly, if this is not possible, a 
superior court may declare legislation to be incompatible with the ECHR, in which 
case the Government may make a remedial order removing the incompatibility from 
the statute.72 Parliament, however, might simply choose not to alter the offending 
legislation meaning that “[t]he constraints upon its [i.e. the HRA’s] exercise by 
Parliament are ultimately political, not legal.”73
                                                 
68 The authors have investigated risk rating for large businesses further J. Freedman, G. Loomer and J. 
Vella, ‘Corporate Tax Risk and Tax Avoidance: New Approaches’, (2009) BTR, 74-116. See also 
Freedman, “
 A third protection is provided by 
Article 6 of the HRA which requires public authorities to adhere to the ECHR, and 
which gives courts the power to strike down any act which does not. In other words, 
the rights set out in the ECHR can be employed as grounds for judicial review, their 
infringement becoming a ground of illegality.  
Tax Risk Management and Corporate Taxpayers - International Tax Administration 
Developments” op. cit.  
69 Financial Markets Law Review Committee,  Issue 146 – Proposed HMRC Code, 
October 2009  http://www.fmlc.org/papers/Issue146Oct09.pdf 
70 Article 3 of the Act.  
71 See R v IRC, ex parte Wilkinson [2005] UKHL 30. Therefore rights protected by means of the ECHR 
may only be overturned by express language or necessary implication to the contrary, as courts 
presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the 
individual. See also Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Pierson [1998] 
A.C. 539.  
72 Articles 4, 5 and 10 of the Act.  
73 Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Pierson [1998] A.C. 539 per Lord 
Hoffmann.  
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Despite the above, there appear to be limited opportunities for these mechanisms to be 
invoked in narrowing HMRC’s discretionary powers discussed in this paper. The 
main substantive right to which appeal could be made, Article 1 of Protocol 1, 
protects the right to property. This includes the protection against deprivation of one’s 
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by 
law and by the general principles of international law. It explicitly does not impair the 
right of a State to enforce such laws as the State deems necessary to secure the 
payment of taxes. Article 14 could also come into play in this context. It provides that 
the enjoyment of the rights set out in the convention shall be secured without 
discrimination.  
 
Legislation conferring discretionary powers could violate Article 1 of Protocol 1 and 
Article 14.74 A judicial review application could also be brought on the grounds that 
HMRC have violated these articles whilst exercising their discretionary powers. 
Examples might include the use of discretionary powers in a discriminatory manner 
contrary to Article 14 or demanding tax that is clearly not required at law and thus 
contrary to Article 1 of Protocol 1. It has been opined, however, that it is debatable 
whether the ECHR could provide a ground for redress in the event that HMRC choose 
not to apply published practice or to respect an undertaken given after full 
disclosure.75
 
  
 
EU Law 
EU membership presents a number of challenges to the traditional UK constitutional 
order. Firstly, EU institutions enact rules enjoying direct effect in the UK. Secondly, 
EU law is superior to domestic law meaning that UK courts must set aside UK 
legislation which is inconsistent with EU law, whether or not the UK legislation was 
enacted before or after the relevant EU law. From the UK perspective,76
 
 the 
relationship between UK and EU law is governed by the European Communities Act 
1972 and therefore it is this Act which allows for these breaks from traditional 
constitutional principles. It follows that the UK Parliament could, at any time, repeal 
this Act and bring an end to the UK’s membership of the EU.  
Direct taxation falls within the competence of Member States; nevertheless EU law 
can affect HMRC’s discretionary powers in an indirect manner in this field. UK direct 
tax law is to be set aside to the extent that it breaches the fundamental freedoms 
protected by EU law. This would appear to mean that legislation purporting to vest 
HMRC with discretionary powers breaching these freedoms would be set aside. 
Similarly, a judicial review action could be brought against HMRC to the extent that 
they utilize their discretion in a manner inconsistent with the freedoms. 
 
 
                                                 
74  For example a law which grants HMRC the discretion to decide whether a tax is to be imposed on 
either men or women. 
75 Natalie Lee (gen ed), Revenue Law – Principles and Practice, 28thth ed., (Bloomsbury, 2010 ), p. 
1532.  
76 EU member states and the EU institutions have divergent views on the question of supremacy of 
parliament. See P. Craig and G. De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 4th. ed., (OUP, 2007), 
chapter 10. 
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4. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND LIMITS PLACED BY CASE LAW ON HMRC 
DISCRETION  
 
The constitutional principles examined in section 3 determine how much discretion 
may be vested in HMRC. They also, to some extent, underpin judicial review, a 
process through which administrative discretion is kept under check. Whilst assessing 
HMRC’s exercise of its discretionary powers through judicial review, the courts have 
probed, set limits on and thus defined the scope of HMRC’s discretionary powers. 
  
Judicial Review 
Judicial review provides one avenue for controlling administrative actions. It has been 
described as  
“ a central control mechanism of administrative law (public law) by which the 
judiciary take the historic constitutional responsibility of protecting against 
abuses of power by public authorities”77
 
 
 It is a procedure through which courts, on the demand of individuals, assess 
administrative actions. The case law has classified the grounds under three general 
heads: illegality, irrationality (or unreasonableness) and procedural impropriety.78
 
 
Each of these grounds can be subdivided into further, more specific grounds, such as 
abuse of power. The categories are not mutually exclusive and the considerations to 
be born in mind under them may even clash, as seen below. 
 Judicial review can thus provide control over the use of discretion, in that it allows 
individuals to challenge actions on the grounds that they were beyond the ambit of the 
relevant authority’s discretionary powers, or, whilst within the authority’s discretion 
they were taken on the basis of irrelevant considerations, for improper purposes or 
following inadequate procedures and so on. It does not, however, allow an appeal on 
the merits of a decision, as a court cannot substitute its decision for that of a public 
authority. In fact, whilst unreasonableness is a ground for review, it denotes a level of 
unreasonableness of outrageous proportion, such that no reasonable person could ever 
take it (known as Wedensbury unreasonableness after the case in which the test was 
established).79
 
  
The ground of illegality, and the doctrine of legitimate expectation developed as part  
of the judicial review jurisprudence, are of particular interest in the context of the 
discretionary powers discussed in this paper. The ground of illegality allows, amongst 
others, reviews of whether a public body acts ultra vires its prescribed powers.  The 
doctrine of legitimate expectation essentially prescribes that in certain situations, 
expectations arise from the behaviour of a public body from which it would be 
unreasonable or unfair for it to renege and this may cover guidance. Discretion A and 
B, and consequently D, raise questions with respect to both; discretion C primarily 
raises questions with respect to illegality; however the categories are overlapping and 
not fixed.                                                                                                        
                                                 
77 M. Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook (5th ed Hart 2008) 2.1 
78 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (“GCHQ”) [1985] AC 374 per Lord 
Diplock.  
79 See GCHQ and Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 
223. 
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The recent development of judicial review, and indeed administrative law, in the UK 
has been remarkable. Over the course of a few decades “the circumstances in which 
the courts have been prepared to provide relief for unlawful administrative action 
have expanded in spectacular fashion”.80 At the same time, there have been 
formidable academic clashes in trying to identify the theoretical basis for judicial 
review.81 The particular nature of the UK’s constitutional set up, including the lack of 
a written constitution and the overpowering strength of the Supremacy of Parliament 
principle, clearly contributed to this uncertainty. It is not the purpose of this paper to 
investigate this debate, and to speculate as to which of the three main theories is to be 
preferred,82 but the view espoused by the authors83
 
 of the influential De Smith’s 
Judicial Review is persuasive:  
“In our view Parliament ought to abide by the necessary requirements of a 
modern European constitutional democracy (one of which is the rule of law). 
From that proposition follows a second: that courts ought to make the 
assumption that the rule of law (and other necessary requirements of 
constitutional democracy) are followed by the legislature. These two 
propositions are qualified only to the extent that the courts may submit to the 
authority of Parliament when it seeks clearly and unambiguously to exclude 
the rule of law or other constitutional fundamentals. Under what 
circumstances the courts are required so to submit depends upon the 
continuing validity of the sovereignty of Parliament as our governing 
constitutional principle.”84
 
 
Under this view, therefore, the very mechanism of judicial review and the grounds 
upon which it can be carried out are ultimately justified by constitutional principle.  
 
The last sentence of the citation merits attention. It recognizes the current pre-
eminence of the doctrine of supremacy of Parliament within the UK constitutional 
set-up, but allows for the possibility of future change. As things stand, however, it is 
generally accepted that the UK Parliament may limit or extend judicial review by 
means of an act of Parliament, “but some ‘common law theorists’ are probably less 
willing than the ‘ultra vires’ adherents to accept that Parliament has absolute authority 
to exclude judicial review”85
 
  
HMRC’s general discretionary powers have been examined by court decisions over 
the years, and as we have seen in Part 2 above, these cases found that HMRC’s 
discretionary powers allow them to enter into back duty agreements,86
                                                 
80 Lord Woolf, J. Jowell and A Le Sueur, De Smith’s Judicial Review, 6th ed., (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2009) (“De Smith”) para 1-001. 
 to give 
81 See P. Craig, Administrative Law, 6th ed.,(Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) (“Craig – Administrative Law”), 
chapter 1 and and De Smith, chapter 1 and references therein.  
82 The three theories are the ultra vires theory, the common law theory and the modified ultra vires 
theory.  
83  The Right Hon Lord Woolf; Professor Jeffrey Jowell, QC and Professor Andrew Le Sueur. 
84 De Smith, para. 1-015.  
85 Bradley and Ewing, op. cit., at p. 727.  
86 IRC v Nuttall [1990] STC 194, CA. 
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guidance and advance clearances87 and to make extra-statutory concessions in some 
circumstances,88 but not to enter into forward tax agreements with an individual .89
 
  
In this section, the focus is on judicial review decisions on HMRC’s discretionary 
powers, with particular reference to the creation of legitimate expectations. This 
provides background to the two case studies to be examined in section 5 
 
Legitimate expectations  
The protection of legitimate expectations is a basic requirement of fairness. It also 
stems from the rule of law, as it is conducive to predictability, regularity and 
certainty. Both procedural and substantive rights can be protected through the 
doctrine of legitimate expectations,90 however, setting out the conditions for a 
legitimate expectation to a substantive benefit to arise is not without difficulty. It 
requires a careful balance to be struck between certainty and fairness for the 
individual on the one hand, and flexibility and public interest on the other.91 
Furthermore, one must consider the possible effects of a rigorous enforcement of 
legitimate expectation, which might include dampening the authorities’ appetite for 
producing policies or other documentation which might give rise to legitimate 
expectations.92
 
  
UK law, on the whole, provides considerable protection of legitimate expectations, 
however, the law in this area is still in a state of development.93 From the taxpayer’s 
perspective, this ground of judicial review is of interest in that representations or 
assurances by HMRC can give rise to legitimate expectations.94 Since R. v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners, ex p Preston95 courts have justified this in terms of fairness. 
In this case the taxpayer sought relief against the use by HMRC of their statutory 
powers to raise an assessment on the ground that they had given an undertaking so not 
to do as part of a wider agreement they reached with the taxpayer. Lord Templeman 
held that HMRC are not allowed to resile from such an undertaking when it would be 
unfair to do so. The unfairness, however, must be such as to amount to an abuse of 
power.96 This would take place if “their conduct would, in the case of an authority 
other than Crown authority, entitle the taxpayer to an injunction or damages based on 
breach of contract or estoppel by representation”.”97
                                                 
87 R v IRC, ex p MFK Underwriting Agency Ltd 
 
[1989] STC 873, Matrix Securities v IRC [1994] STC 
272, HL 
88 R (on the application of Wilkinson) v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2006] STC 270. 
89 Al Fayed v Advocate General for Scotland [2004] STC 1703   
90 DeSmith pp. 609 et seq. 
91 On the arguments in favour and against the protection of substantive legitimate expectations see 
Craig – Administrative Law at pp. 650-653.  
92 Ibid.  
93 Oxfam v Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch), para. 47. 
94 A review of these cases can be found in Simon’s Taxes (Butterworths) Binder 2  A5.303. 
95 [1985] 1 AC 835. 
96 Preston was cited in the seminal case R. v North and East Devon Health Authority Ex p. Coughlan 
[2001] Q.B. 213.  as authority for the proposition that when a substantive legitimate expectation arose, 
courts would decide whether the frustration of the expectation was so unfair that to take a new and 
different course of action would amount to an abuse of power. For a discussion of Coughlan  see Craig 
– Administrative Law at pp. 654-658. 
97 As Paul Craig has noted, “although the judgment was framed in terms of abuse of power, the 
Revenue’s action could only have been thus regarded if its prior representation gave rise to some 
normative expectation which was worthy of protection” .Ibid. at p. 671. 
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The limits of the  legitimate expectation principle 
A particular problem in applying legitimate expectation in revenue law cases is that 
the orthodox position currently is that unfair, as it might seem, an ultra vires 
assurance cannot give rise to a legitimate expectation.
Basis in a lawful promise 
98 Fairness considerations for 
individual taxpayers are here trumped by the public interest. It has been stated, in this 
respect, that allowing legitimate expectations to arise in such cases would have the 
“dual effect of unlawfully extending the statutory power [of the relevant public body] 
and destroying the ultra vires doctrine by permitting public bodies arbitrarily to 
extend their powers.”99 Although critical of this, the courts appear to feel bound by it, 
subject to some softening of this position where the Human Rights Act applies to an 
expectation relating to property that can be a possession. 100
 
  Subject to this, the 
current position at law appears to be that legitimate expectation can only arise on the 
basis of a lawful promise or practice.  
In the case of HMRC there is recognition in the case law that there is a discretion not 
to collect all tax due in some circumstances and this must be seen as intra vires to 
enable it to be protected by the doctrine of legitimate expectation. At some point, 
however, the failure to apply the law becomes ultra vires and therefore not subject to 
protection by legitmate expectation. The dividing line is illustrated in the Al Fayed 
case,101 where it was accepted that HMRC had power to forgo the collection of the 
full amount of tax due , taking into account the difficulties of  assessing accurately the 
total amount, but no power to accept an advance  assessment of liability. Thus an 
agreement in respect of past tax due was valid, but an agreement in respect of forward 
payments was ultra vires and so could not be the basis of a legitimate expectation 
claim. HMRC did not, therefore, act unfairly in terminating an agreement early.102 
Lord Cullen was plain in finding that “[t]here can be no legitimate expectation that a 
public body will continue to implement an agreement when it has no power to do 
so.”103
 
 
This gives rise to similar issues of validity to that in Wilkinson of what is a lawful 
concession and what is not. It involves a very difficult dividing line and one which it 
may be hard for a taxpayer to discern.    
 
As Lord Justice May stated in the Rowland case,104
                                                 
98 R (Bibi) v Newham London Borough Council [2002] 1 WLR 237, 249, para 46 per Schiemann LJ; R 
v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, Ex p Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115, 1125 per Gibson 
LJ. See the discussion and cases cited in De Smith p 636.  
 if the logic of the jurisprudential 
principle is followed through to its inexorable end (that is, ultra vires acts can never 
bind), this can create hardship to the individual and it is not clear why the loss should 
99 R. v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Ex p. Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd [1995] 2 All 
ER 714, 731 per Sedley LJ.  
100 Rowland v Environment Agency [2003] EWCA Civ 1885; 2005 Ch. 1.  
101 [2004] STC 1703 
102 Para. 114. The court held that it was not even within HMRC’s discretion to respect the then current 
agreement once it was understood to be ultra vires. 
103 See also Judge J in MFK: 'No legitimate expectation could arise from an ultra vires relaxation of the 
relevant statute by the body responsible for enforcing it'. 
104 Citing Paul Craig, Administrative Law 4th ed 1999 pp635-650. See pp. 682-691 of the latest edition, 
Craig, op. cit.  
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be borne by the person who relies on the representation. On the other hand, to allow 
reliance on an ultra vires statement could enable public officers to extend their powers 
at will, and that would be to the detriment of the public at large. There is clearly a 
very difficult balancing act to be performed here, no made easier by the difficulty of 
finding where the tightrope begins and ends. 
 
The limits of guidance  
Legitimate expectations can arise from a practice. In R v IRC, ex p Unilever 105
 
 it was 
held that HMRC could not frustrate a legitimate expectation created by its long 
practice of accepting a claim for a tax refund despite the statutory time limit having 
expired. This was so even though HMRC had not made any representation to the 
taxpayer about the practice claimed to be binding - it had simply developed over the 
years.  It was not irrelevant to the judges, however that this was a procedural rather 
than a substantive issue.  
Most of the revenue cases dealing with legitimate expectation involve representations 
of one of the types described in Part 2 above, either specific to the taxpayer or more 
general guidance.  Whilst there has been some uncertainty in the past on the matter,106 
in MFK it was held there is “[n]o doubt [that] a statement formally published by the 
Revenue to the world might safely be regarded as binding, subject to its terms, in any 
case falling clearly within them”.107 This starting point was recently confirmed in 
Gaines-Cooper,108 although the actual result of that case somewhat undermines the 
proposition, as discussed below.    Circumstances might arise which justify a change 
in the guidance; however, HMRC accepts that it will normally remain bound to the 
guidance unless and until it announces a change, which would apply prospectively.109
 
  
Less formal representations by HMRC, such as a ruling or statement, may also give 
rise to legitimate expectations as seen in cases such as Preston. In MFK it was 
suggested however, that representations of this kind would require a more detailed                      
enquiry. In particular they will only give rise to a legitimate expectation if the 
“taxpayer put all his cards face upwards on the table” and the ruling or statement must 
be “clear, unambiguous and devoid of qualification”.110
 
  
This condition does not, however, seem very different from that applicable to  
published concessions and guidance. These more general statements are almost 
always subject to caveats, which frequently state that they are inoperative in cases of 
avoidance.  How this impacts on the legitimacy of any expectations arising can be a 
difficult question of fact and this may be very undermining of the protection offered 
by the general statements and guidance as well as any individual clearances offered.  
Taxpayers must prove that the facts at issue fall four square with the descriptions or 
examples used in the guidance. This is often difficult due to the use of loose and 
cautious language and relatively simple examples given in the guidance.  
                                                 
105 R v IRC, ex p Unilever[1996] STC 681  
106 De Smith, Woolf and Jowell, “Judicial Review of Administrative Action” (5th edition) p. 938. 
107 [1989] STC 873 at 892.  
108 Para 18. Note, however, the lack of trust by members of the tax profession to HMRC’s commitment 
to this view. Paras. 20-21. 
109 Para. 19. HMRC’s acceptance of this point with regards to Statements of Practice can be seen in 
their Administrative Law Manual ADML5100. 
110 At p. 892.  
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In R v Inland Revenue Comrs, ex p Fulford-Dobson111 it was held that HMRC were 
not bound by an extra-statutory concession because of a caveat stating that 
concessions would not be given “in any case where an attempt is made to use it for 
tax avoidance”. In R (on the appn of Thompson) v Fletcher112 the court cited a caveat 
as one of the grounds on which the taxpayers’ challenge, which was based on the 
wording of HMRC documents, failed. Similarly, in the recently decided Hanover 
Company Services Limited v The Commissioners for her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs,113 a caveat led the First Tier Tax Tribunal to the conclusion that the 
representation in a particular Manual114
 
 could not have given rise to a legitimate 
expectation. The particular “health warning” in this case was that found in the 
Introduction to HMRC’s Guidance Manuals. This caveat thus applies to all HMRC 
Manuals and provides: 
“It should not be assumed that the guidance is comprehensive nor that it will 
provide a definitive answer in every case. HMRC are expected to use their own 
judgement, based on their training and experience, in applying the guidance to 
the facts of particular cases…Subject to these qualifications readers may assume 
that the guidance given will be applied in the normal case; but where HMRC 
considers that there is, or may have been, avoidance of tax the guidance will not 
necessarily apply.” 115
 
 
The decision in Hanover was one from a first level tribunal and has caused concern. It 
may well be appealed.   If it were correct, HMRC’s Manuals, as a whole, would 
simply be incapable of producing legitimate expectations and would be a useless tool 
or even worse, a trap for the unwary. It cannot be fair that HMRC can side-step 
completely any commitment to the interpretations laid out in its Manuals by the 
simple expedient of a general caveat. This is especially so once one considers the 
reliance placed by HMRC and some politicians  on the use of guidance, as well as the 
recent efforts by HMRC to encourage taxpayers to comply with the interpretations 
contained therein. It stands to reason that guidance will not provide the definite 
answer in every case. Equally, the premises upon which the interpretation is given 
must surely be met; however, once that is done it would be unfair to the point of being 
an abuse of power for HMRC to be entitled to disown their interpretation on the basis 
of a general, exculpatory caveat. In a public law situation of this sort, it cannot be fair 
to apply a caveat of this sort on the basis that the party to whose detriment the caveat 
operates had notice of it.  
 
The reference to “avoidance” in the caveat could be a particular source for concern. 
Avoidance is a vague term which means different things to different persons. The 
subjective nature of the term might infuse the caveat with indeterminacy, meaning 
that taxpayers are left with the message that the Manual will generally be followed 
unless it is decided that it should not. 
 
                                                 
111 [1987] STC 344 Note that this case was decided pre Wilkinson. 
112 [2002] STC 1149.  
113 [2010] UKFTT 256 (TC). 
114 The Supply and Consideration Manual VATSC. 
115 Available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/advisory.htm. For more examples see R Fraser, “The 
white open spaces” – Revenue practice and penalties for negligent conduct” [2006] BTR 385, at p. 386. 
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Reliance is another factor which can hinder the emergence of a legitimate expectation. 
The taxpayers’ lack of reliance on the relevant Manual116 in Fletcher, for example, 
was another reason cited by the court in rejecting the taxpayers’ challenge. Still, there 
appears to be some uncertainty about this factor. In Oxfam v HMRC117 Sales J 
considered the issue of reliance at some length showing how its relevance varies from 
case to case depending on the overall context. In some contexts it can be 
determinative, in others less so. In a case where the assurance was only given to one 
taxpayer and in the court’s view the public authority was not acting irrationally by 
adopting a different approach to that given in the assurance, the lack of detrimental 
reliance would be fatal.118 In other circumstances it would be irrelevant. One example 
given by Sales J is that of a general statement of policy which is not altered by the 
authority, but is applied differently to one particular individual without good reason. 
In such a case, even if the individual did not rely on the general policy, he would have 
a good claim to be entitled to the benefit of that policy as ordinary rules of public law 
prevent a public authority from acting arbitrarily and capriciously.119 On the other 
hand, the authors of a leading work on judicial review to conclude “it is surely right 
that reliance should be a ‘necessary precondition’ of a legitimate expectation ‘where 
statements are made to the public at large’”. 120
 
 
A finding that a taxpayer did not rely on HMRC’s published representation was 
determinative in Hanover. Whether a lack of reliance ought to be fatal for a taxpayer 
depends, as seen above, on the particular circumstances of the case and no hard and 
fast rule can be set. Rather disconcertingly, however, in this case the court found that 
the taxpayer did not rely on the guidance despite the fact that he relied on his 
accountant’s advice who in turn had relied on the guidance. This seems to be incorrect 
unless there is some reason why the agent should be aware of something which makes 
the guidance wrong, and that view is supported by a recent first tier tribunal decision 
.121
                                                 
116 Note that the court also found that the Manual did not support the taxpayers’ case. See paras. 48 and 
49. 
 Ultimately, as seen, legitimate expectations are protected to ensure that authorities 
do not act in a manner that is so unfair as to amount to an abuse of power. Even if the 
need for reliance was established as a determinative factor in all cases, it would still 
would appear unfair to the point of an abuse of power if a taxpayer were denied 
protection on the ground that he relied on guidance indirectly through an advisor and 
117 [2009] EWHC 3078 (Ch) 
118 Paras. 50 and 55. 
119 Para. 54. 
120 De Smith at p. 627. 
121 See B&J Shopfitting Services v The Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs [2010] 
UKFTT 78 (TC), the First-Tier Tax Tribunal (FTTT). This was a simple appeal to the FTTT rather 
than an action for judicial review, however, similar issues were raised. An agent relied on HMRC 
guidance and oral advice given by HMRC’s helpline in filing the tax return of a partnership on behalf 
of a client. The return was filed late, but within a period which guidance and advice suggested would 
not lead to the imposition of a penalty. The guidance and advice turned out to be misleading, and, 
therefore, a penalty was imposed in line with the correct interpretation of the law. The FTTT was thus 
asked to set the penalty aside, as empowered by section 93A(7) of the TMA on the ground of the 
existence of a “reasonable excuse for not delivering it [i.e. the return] in time”. The question was 
whether having relied on what was admitted to be misleading guidance and advice constituted a 
‘reasonable excuse’. HMRC argued that it did not because ignorance of the law cannot be an excuse. 
The tribunal found that it did. For our purposes the interesting point to note is that in reaching its 
decision the Tribunal also found that “in this case I considered the acts of the agent – in particular the 
reliance on HMRC's website — as if it were reliance by the Appellant”. Para 13.  Many agents do 
indeed rely on HMRC guidance at present- hence the concern about the Hanover case. 
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not directly.  
 
 
The value of the legitimate expectations doctrine in controlling revenue discretion   
The limitations discussed here explain why, despite the availability of protection for 
legitimate expectations arising out of formal and less formal representations, it is very 
seldom that taxpayers are successful in judicial review procedures on these grounds. 
That in itself cannot be determinative of the utility of the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations in keeping HMRC to their word as laid down in the various formal 
documentation. Beneath the admittedly thin surface of successful applications, 
anecdotal evidence from practitioners and professional literature suggests that in 
reality at most levels HMRC does generally accept the validity of a taxpayers’ tax 
arrangements on the grounds that they conform to their stated interpretation, but there 
may often be discussion about the facts and HMRC will feel free to change its mind 
for prospective cases.  
 
The use of legitimate expectations in the revenue field, and some particular problems 
raised by the jurisprudence, is considered further, in the context of two case studies, in 
the part that follows.  
 
 
 
5. Two Case Studies 
 
A. Over-inclusive legislation narrowed by guidance: Section 16A of the Taxation 
of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 
The enactment of the broadly drafted section 16 A of the Taxation of Chargeable 
Gains Act 1992 (“s. 16A”) elicited considerable dismay and even protest. The main 
associations of tax professionals argued that its broad scope caught objectionable and 
unobjectionable transactions alike, necessitating reliance on HMRC guidance and/or 
practice to narrow it sensibly. Other pieces of revenue legislation have been similarly 
charged, turning the issue into one of more general concern.122
 
  
Background 
S. 16A contains a Targeted Anti-Avoidance Rule (“TAAR”) which is meant to target 
the objectionable creation and use of capital losses. The history of the enactment of 
this provision is instructive and deserves being laid out in some detail. The Pre-
Budget Report 2006123 included a draft of a more comprehensive TAAR than that 
then in force in this area.124
                                                 
122 Another example is the Stamp Duty Land Tax TAAR introduced by s 75 A of the Finance Act 2003. 
See Patrick Cannon, “New SDLT general anti-avoidance rule” Tax Journal 2007, 874, 6-8. Similar 
concerns were raised as early as 1995: Amanda K Rowland, “Is the Revenue being fair? Revenue 
Statements and judicial review” BTR 2 [1995] 115-121.Arguably, a similar issue has arisen in recent 
years in other areas of law, such as the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the Bribery Act 2010. On the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 see J. R. Spencer, “The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (2) Child and family 
offences”, Criminal Law Review [2004] 347. 
 A statement setting out the principles underlying the 
123 This was published on the 6th of December 2006. 
124 A narrower version of this TAAR, aimed only at the creation and use of capital losses by 
companies, was first introduced in the Finance Act 2006 following a brief period of consultation and 
found its way in section 8 (2A) to (2C) of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20091222074811/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/pbr2005/capital-
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TAAR (the “Statement”) and draft guidance were published at the same time.125 
Apart from providing a description of the type of transactions the TAAR was 
targeting, the guidance also included examples of transactions that HMRC deemed to 
be within or outside the ambit of the TAAR. These publications marked the start of a 
consultation which saw a number of bodies express their concerns,126 despite being in 
agreement with the broad policy behind the TAAR. The Chartered Institute of 
Taxation (“CIOT”)127 and the Tax Faculty of the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales (“ICAEW”) 128
 
 both presented hard-hitting documents. Their 
concern was primarily that the TAAR appeared to catch a broader range of 
transactions than HMRC envisaged in the guidance and Statement. A number of 
issues followed from this primary concern. Firstly, that relying on HMRC discretion 
not to apply the full force of the TAAR was not acceptable. Secondly, that HMRC 
might not have the discretion to apply the TAAR in this restrictive manner.  
These concerns reached, and were discussed by the House of Commons Public Bill 
Committee.129 The response of Ed Balls, then Economic Secretary to the Treasury, 
echoed the written response given by HMRC. HMRC concluded:130
 
 
The Government believes that the rule will not be applicable in the extremely wide 
range of situations asserted by the respondents… Where there have been no contrived 
or artificial arrangements, or where there has been a genuine loss on a genuine disposal, 
the rule will not apply. The Government believes therefore that most of the concerns 
raised during the consultation are unfounded and the position can be clarified through 
guidance.  
 
 
HMRC thus issued two revised and extended versions of the guidance,131
                                                                                                                                           
losses.pdf. The draft guidance was subject to a period of consultation lasting till the 5th of February 
2006. A revised draft of the legislation was published on the 22nd March 2006 and was then included in 
Finance Bill 2006. Revised Guidance was also published on the 22 March 2006. 
 containing 
some significant changes to the explanatory part and a considerable number of new 
examples and more detailed explanations as to why HMRC believed some were 
caught and others were not. Crucially, however, the draft legislation was unchanged 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget2006/capital-losses.pdf 
125http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/channelsPortalWebApp.portal?_nfpb=true&_pa
geLabel=pageImport_ShowContent&id=HMCE_PROD1_026426&propertyType=document 
126 Both in writing as well as during purposely convened meetings. The TAAR was discussed with a 
number of representative bodies at a meeting of the CGT Review Group on 16 January 2007. This was 
followed up at a separate meeting with representatives of the CIOT, Law Society, STEP and the Tax 
Faculty of the ICAEW on 6 February 2007. 
127 The CIOT presented its views, as well as those of the Law Society and the Society of Trust and 
Estate Practitioners. http://www.tax.org.uk/attach.pl/5250/5456/CGTlossesTAAR%20final090207.pdf 
128 TAXREP 07/07. This document can be found at: 
http://www.icaew.com/index.cfm/route/157009/icaew_ga/en/Faculties/Tax/Publications_and_technical
_guidance/Publications_archive/Tax_representations_2007 
129 The relevant debates took place on Thursday the 17th of May 2007 and can be found at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmpublic/finance/070517/am/70517s01.htm 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmpublic/finance/070517/pm/70517s01.htm  
130http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/channelsPortalWebApp.portal?_nfpb=true&_pa
geLabel=pageLibrary_ConsultationDocuments&propertyType=document&columns=1&id=HMCE_P
ROD1_027247 
131These were issued on the 1st of March and then again on the 19th of July 2007 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/cgt/cgt-recent-developments.pdf 
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and it was thus introduced in section 27 of Finance Act 2007.132 The CIOT responded 
to both revisions of Guidance,133 reiterating its broader concerns in no uncertain 
terms:“[t]he CIOT disagrees strongly with the majority of HMRC’s Guidance, 
believing it to be in contradiction to the clear wording of section 16.”134
 
 It also stated 
that whilst it agreed with some of the conclusions on the applicability of the TAAR                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
to the examples given, it disagreed with the reasoning in all but one example.  
 
Main charge: law broader than guidance  
S. 16 A reads:  
 
“(1) For the purposes of this Act, “allowable loss” does not include a loss accruing to 
a person if– 
(a) it accrues to the person directly or indirectly in consequence of, or otherwise in 
connection with, any arrangements, and 
(b) the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the arrangements is to secure a 
tax advantage. 
 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)– 
 
“arrangements” includes any agreement, understanding, scheme, transaction or series 
of transactions (whether or not legally enforceable), and  
 
“tax advantage” means– 
(a) relief or increased relief from tax, 
(b) repayment or increased repayment of tax, 
(c) the avoidance or reduction of a charge to tax or an assessment to tax, or 
(d) the avoidance of a possible assessment to tax, 
 
and for the purposes of this definition “tax” means capital gains tax, corporation tax 
or income tax. 
 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1) it does not matter– 
 
(a) whether the loss accrues at a time when there are no chargeable gains from which 
it could otherwise have been deducted, or 
 
(b) whether the tax advantage is secured for the person to whom the loss accrues or 
for any other person.” 
 
The representative bodies’ main concern is that HMRC’s interpretation, as it emerges 
                                                 
132 The section had effect in relation to losses accruing on disposals made on or after 6th December 
2006. 
133 These are available at http://www.tax.org.uk/ 
134 Ibid. para. 2.1. 
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from the Guidance,135 appears to narrow s. 16A by appealing to tests that are not 
found in the provision itself. The Guidance includes, for example,136 the following 
two statements: “[t]he straightforward use of a statutory relief does not of itself bring 
arrangements within the TAAR”137 and that “[t]he legislation will not apply where 
there is a genuine economic transaction that gives rise to a real economic loss as a 
result of a real disposal”.138 These statements are not as clearly off the mark as others 
found in previous versions of the Guidance,139
 
 nevertheless, they are still, arguably, 
misleading and incorrect.  
Take the simple example of an individual who holds shares at a loss and decides to 
sell them. Assume also that the sole purpose of the sale, made to an independent third 
party, is that of crystallizing the loss to be set against a chargeable gain made that 
year. Had the individual not made the gain he would have held on to the shares in the 
hope that they might eventually regain their value. Both statements from the Guidance 
suggest that such a sale is not caught by the TAAR; however one might argue that this 
view is not supported by the TAAR’s wording. The sale constitutes an arrangement 
which was certainly carried out for the sole purpose of obtaining tax relief. The 
requirements of the legislation appear to be met. That the sale was a “straightforward 
use of a statutory relief” or that it was a “genuine economic transaction that gives rise 
to a real economic loss as a result of a real disposal” arguably make no difference to 
the application of the TAAR in this case.  
 
The examples provided in the Guidance and the explanatory notes140
 
 reveal that 
HMRC’s interpretation relies on tests and criteria not found in the legislation. We can 
take one of the examples as an illustration.  
“An individual, J, invests in shares under the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS), with 
a view to securing income tax relief.  In order to fund the purchase of the shares J sells 
a capital asset which is standing at a loss to a third party.” 
 
After agreeing that the transactions would constitute an arrangement for the purposes 
of the TAAR, HMRC state: 
 
“To decide what J’s main purpose was in entering into these arrangements, it is 
necessary to consider the overall economic objective of the arrangements, and whether 
that objective is being fulfilled in a straightforward way, or whether additional, 
complex or costly steps have been inserted.  J has made a real disposal of a capital asset 
in a straightforward way, and has incurred a genuine economic loss.  There have been 
                                                 
135 Unless the context suggest otherwise, “Guidance” from this point on refers to the guidance issued 
on the 19th of July 2007. 
136 More detailed analysis of the Guidance can be found in the CIOT documents cited above and in S. 
McKie “Should Humpty Dumpty be your guide?”  (2007) 6 Private Client Business 416-426; E. Reed 
“Br’er Gordon and TAAR Baby” (2007) 5 Private Client Business 323-330; J. De Souza, “Tax Editor’s 
Notes”, (2007) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 386-390. 
137 Para. 13.  
138 Para. 20. 
139 The draft Guidance issued on the 6th of December 2006 included, for example, the statement: “[t]he 
legislation is intended to have effect where a person enters deliberately and knowingly into 
arrangements to avoid tax”, whilst the legislation does not speak of avoidance or of specific intentions. 
140 Explanatory notes to UK legislation have no interpretative force. In most circumstances the Courts 
will look only at the wording of the legislation when construing it- background documents are 
generally considered irrelevant- see fn 143 below and text thereto.. 
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no additional, costly or complex steps inserted into the transactions.  The fact that the 
disposal has been made with a view to using the proceeds to invest in shares which fall 
within the EIS tax regime does not mean that the arrangements have been entered into 
with a main purpose of securing a tax advantage, because the straightforward use of a 
statutory relief does not of itself bring arrangements within the TAAR.  Hence the 
TAAR does not apply.”  
 
The CIOT have argued that it is hard to understand why this transaction is not caught 
by the TAAR as currently worded. There clearly is an arrangement the main purpose 
of which is to obtain tax relief.  It is true, as HMRC note, that J’s objective is being 
fulfilled in a straightforward way, that no additional, complex or costly steps have 
been inserted, and that J has made a real disposal and has incurred a genuine 
economic loss. It not fully clear, however, why these facts ought to bring J outside the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
scope of the TAAR. The language of the provision does not suggest that they should. 
  
These facts, or tests, are used by HMRC in determining the applicability of the TAAR 
to many of the examples in the Guidance. They are also listed as circumstances that 
need to be taken into consideration to determine if one of the main purposes of the 
arrangement was that of obtaining a tax advantage. Whilst they may seem to be 
intuitive tests of tax avoidance, they are not derived from the language of the 
legislation, and it is beyond the power of HMRC to substitute its own understanding 
of the text for the meaning of the wording, ultimately as interpreted by the Courts. 
The fact that HMRC may have been involved in designing the policy of the 
legislation and instructing the draftsman does not mean that they have any role in 
interpretation under the UK system and to assert that they do would be beyond their 
powers.  Here it seems that HMRC are interpreting the TAAR by giving effect to 
what they envisaged its underlying principle to be rather than its wording. In effect 
they are tying to use this as a widely based anti-avoidance provision rather than 
relating to its precise terms.  
 
Although the discrepancy between the Guidance and the TAAR was forcefully 
brought to the attention of HMRC and Government by the representative bodies, the 
response of the Government appeared to be that guidance was adequate to cut down 
the legislation and make it clear that the rule will not apply where there have been no 
contrived or artificial arrangements, or where there has been a genuine loss on a 
genuine disposal. This response is significant. At no stage did HMRC or the 
Economic Secretary to the Treasury addressing the point during the Parliamentary 
debates address the fact that these factors could not be inferred from the language of 
the TAAR. They simply repeated that the TAAR was not as broad as suggested, 
without paying heed to the simple matter that it was hard to see the grounds on which 
it could be narrowed in the way suggested.  
 
During the Parliamentary debates the Economic Secretary, the Rt. Hon Ed Balls said: 
 
“In the real world of tax policy making and, with respect to the hon. Member for 
Braintree, in the real world of business, the best way to provide clarity is not always to 
make legislation more complex or restrictive. Indeed, adding such complexity can 
undermine the best efforts of both sides to find a sensible way forward. That is why 
consultation on guidance, rather than restriction and legislation, can often be a better 
was to proceed in tax policy making. I urge him to reflect on that point a little further.” 
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Rather than making sure that the wording of the legislation reflects the intended 
principle, the approach was to insist that the wording should be understood in line 
with the principle.  
 
Discussion 
Statutory interpretation is not a precise science. For a start its method changes over 
time. Indeed, it is often said that in the UK there have been shifts from the mischief 
rule to the literal rule, onto the golden rule and finally to the purposive approach. 
Furthermore, there was never a clean cut from one to the other and examples can be 
found within each period of the different approaches.141 All one can discern therefore, 
is a general trend within a given period.142
 
 Also, judges’ application of these rules 
inevitably differs.  
Purposive interpretation is currently the dominant mode of interpretation in the 
UK.143 It enjoins a court to interpret a statute in a manner that furthers its purpose 
even if that necessitates a strained interpretation of the language. Resort to the 
purpose of the statute is not, as is at times opined, limited only to situations in which 
an ordinary interpretation of the statute would lead to an absurdity or an injustice. 
Indeed, the purpose of a statute is part of the context against which the words in the 
statute must be read. The purpose of the provision or the statute may be sought by 
looking within the four corners of the statute, as well as at external sources such as 
earlier statutes, relevant international treaties, government reports, and now, following 
Pepper v. Hart,144 subject to the limitations mentioned therein, Parliamentary 
debates.145
 
   
Whilst statutory purpose thus plays an important role in the current practice of 
interpretation, and the set of materials which may be consulted is wider than ever, the 
starting point in statutory interpretation remains the language of the statute. 
Furthermore, whilst a strained meaning can be given to the language of a statute so as 
to give effect to its purpose, there is a point beyond which interpretation becomes 
unacceptable legislation. The difficulty is that in practice individual judges will 
identify this point at different parts of the interpretation-legislation continuum. In 
other words, individual judges have different appetites for giving statues strained 
meanings.  
 
Examples of rather strained interpretations can be found in the tax field, including in 
                                                 
141 See Zander’s comments to the effect that although there was a general move towards a purposive 
approach in the latter part of the twentieth century “there were still plenty of examples of the literal 
approach” M. Zander, The Law-Making Process, 6th ed., (Cambridge University Press, 2004) p. 146.  
142 The Law Commission, The Interpretation of Statutes, Law Com. No. 21, (HMSO) (1969), para. 
[22]. 
143 Carter v. Bradbeer [1975] 3 All E.R. 158, 161 g per Lord Diplock; Pepper v. Hart [1993] A.C. 
593, 617 E per Lord Griffiths; Regina (Quintavalle) v. Secretary of State for Health [2003] UKHL 13, 
[2003] 2 A.C. 687, at [21] per Lord Steyn. See also J. Steyn, ‘The Intractable Problem of the 
Interpretation of Legal Texts in S. Worthington (ed.) Commercial Law and Commercial Practice (Hart 
Publishing) (2003) pp.7, 12 and 16. 
144 [1992] S.T.C. 898. 
145 See J. Bell and G. Engle, Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed., (Butterworths, 1995), chapters 5 
and 6; and, Zander op. cit. at pp. 149-179. Pepper v. Hart has been criticised in some quarters. See for 
example: J. Steyn, ‘Pepper v. Hart; A Re-examination’ (2001) OJLS, 21, 59; A. Kavanagh, ‘Pepper v 
Hart and Matters of Constitutional Principle’ (2005) LQR, 121, 98. 
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the Ramsay line of cases on tax avoidance.146 Indeed, once it became clear that the 
Ramsay Approach could, for constitutional reasons, only be a process of 
interpretation, one was forced to conclude that either some of the cases following that 
approach were either decided wrongly or involved a considerably strained 
interpretation.147
 
 On the other hand, tax cases can be found in which judges 
acknowledged the need to refer to the purpose of the statute but felt unable to stretch 
the language of the legislation beyond a certain limit to give effect to such purpose. 
Having briefly discussed purposive interpretation we can now assess the value of 
HMRC’s section 16 A Guidance.  The CIOT believe that much of the s16 A Guidance 
“represents concessionary treatment which may well be beyond the power of HMRC 
to promulgate” 148
 
  It may appear  strange for a body representing taxpayers to make 
this point, because HMRC may well be taking a more lenient view of the law than the 
CIOT. The danger lies in the extent to which taxpayers (and their advisers) can rely 
on this Guidance if HMRC change their minds. For a professional body this is of the 
utmost importance in advising its members.   
It might be argued, on HMRC’s behalf, that their interpretation of s. 16 A is simply 
strongly purposive and that this is well within their powers of management. 
Therefore, under the principles discussed in part 4 above, the Guidance would be such 
as to found a legitimate expectation. The lack of clarity about the exact limits of 
purposive interpretation favours HMRC in this regard in that strong purposivism is 
one of the different, yet apparently equally possible, forms of purposive interpretation 
espoused by UK courts over the past few decades.  This view could be upheld by the 
courts, but it could also be argued that HMRC are going beyond strong purposivism 
in this instance because they give little attention to the words used in the provision. 
Indeed, some might say that rather than employing the purpose of the provision to 
inform its interpretation, HMRC appear to substitute the provision with different 
formulations of the purpose and apply the latter to test whether the transaction is 
caught. Even strong purposivism does not allow for the simple substitution of the 
words of the statute with the purported purpose.  
 
The problem for the taxpayer at present is that he cannot know whether this is an 
interpretation within the scope of HMRC’s powers on the one hand or a concession 
which attempts to  legislate where Parliament has  not done so (as suggested might 
occur by the House of Lords in Wilkinson) or promises to refrain from collecting tax 
due (as  was held to be ultra vires in  Al Fayed,) on the other hand . The section 16 A 
Guidance differs from Al Fayed in that it is guidance to all and not a deal with one 
taxpayer- nevertheless it may be held by the courts to favour some taxpayers over 
others.  If the taxpayer cannot be sure whether the Guidance is within the lawful 
power of HMRC to give then he cannot know whether the Guidance will give rise to a 
legitimate expectation and so cannot rely on it. 
 
These are not purely academic concerns. Clearly they preoccupied the ICAEW149
                                                 
146 WT Ramsay  Ltd v IRC [1981] STC 174. 
 and 
the CIOT. If, as is now being discussed, a General Anti Avoidance Rule is to be 
147 For a discussion of interpretation of tax statutes in this context see J Freedman, 'Interpreting Tax 
Statutes: Tax Avoidance and the Intention of Parliament' (2007) 123 Law Quarterly Review 53. 
148 Para 5,2 CIOT note “Targeted Anti-avoidance Rule  guidance”  14th Jan 2008 .  
149 Para 36 ICAEW note, supra. . 
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introduced in the UK, this will almost certainly be accompanied by guidance and even 
without this, guidance is being given a greater and greater role in the tax system. 
These, then, are issues that need to be clarified as a matter of some urgency. There 
should at least be an undertaking by HMRC, backed by Government, that guidance 
will not be retracted without a certain period of notice and never retrospectively. The 
protection of legitimate expectations is ultimately based on fairness, surely, nothing 
could be more unfair than HMRC arguing that they ought not to be bound by its 
interpretation because it acted ultra vires in giving it. This would be particularly so 
given the vociferous opposition to the guidance during the consultation, and HMRC 
and the then Government’s insistence on proceeding with it.   
B. The IR 20 Guidance cases- Davies and Gaines-Cooper.  
 
The second case study involves recent litigation which is to be heard by the Supreme 
Court. The case is worthy of a topic for a paper in its own right150; the discussion in 
this paper will be brief but is important, because these joined cases bring together 
questions about the  reliability or otherwise of HMRC Guidance and, potentially, the 
extent to which concessions may become binding by way of practice as well as 
written guidance. In fact, the Court of Appeal avoided many of these issues in the 
case before them (R(on the application of Davies and another) v HMRC; R  (on the 
application of Gaines-Cooper) v HMRC (hereafter the Gaines-Cooper case)151
 
 The 
judgments are generally considered to be rather disappointing by the tax community 
because of their failure to settle some of these points and there is considerable relief 
when the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal.  On the other hand, the case does 
confirm the principle that extra-statutory guidance may be binding and that HMRC 
cannot simply claim in every case that the Wilkinson principle prevents them from 
making any binding concessions at all.  
IR 20  
IR 20 was the name given to guidance on the definition of residence and ordinary 
residence for tax purposes, both of which concepts have tax implications.152
 
 Its 
history is given in the case. The definition of residence is derived from case law only 
and as long ago as 1936 the Income Tax Codification Committee complained about 
the absence of guidance to taxpayers.  In 1973 the Inland Revenue as it then was 
issued a booklet – IR 20 – to give guidance. This is an excellent example of an 
indeterminate area of law. It is unlikely that a statutory bright line definition could 
ever be devised that would not be open to significant manipulation and therefore it 
seems to be an appropriate area for a broad statutory provision backed up by 
guidance. It had widely been thought by practitioners and commentators that IR20 did 
provide some bright lines or safe harbours but the Court of Appeal held in the  Gaines 
Cooper case held that on a proper interpretation of the Guidance the specific 
paragraphs relied upon had to be read in the context of the legislation as a whole and, 
as such, did not have the interpretation the taxpayers argued for. In addition the Court 
did not consider that the HMRC had changed its interpretation and application 
(despite considerable evidence to the contrary).  
                                                 
150 For  case comments see  S. Eden, [2010] BTR 322; L. Higginbottom and A. Savin, “Gaines-Cooper: 
case review”, 2010  Tax Journal 1019, 7–8; P. Vaines and B.Wilkins, “Gaines-Cooper”, 2010 Tax 
Journal 1019, 9. 
151 [2010] 860 
152 This has been withdrawn but is, unusually, available online at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/pdfs/ir20.pdf 
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The preface of IR20 states 
 
“The notes below are not binding in law and do not affect rights of appeal 
about your own tax….. You should bear in mind that the booklet offers 
general guidance on how the rules apply, but whether the guidance is 
appropriate in a particular case will depend on all the facts of that case. If you 
have any difficulty in applying the rules in your own case, you should consult 
an HM Revenue & Customs Tax Office….. 
Some practices explained in this booklet are concessions made by HM 
Revenue & Customs. 
A concession will not be given in any case where an attempt is made to use 
it for tax avoidance.” 
 
As will be apparent from the discussion of judicial review in part 4, this raises many 
issues about the reliability of IR20, to which we may add the point that since this area 
of the law is so fact dependent , each case depends entirely on its own particular 
details. Further paragraphs of the Guidance are also very broad and therefore it is not 
really surprising that the Court of Appeal found a way to uphold HMRC’s 
interpretation of the Guidance on all the facts. It is a little more surprising, however, 
that the Court went into great detail on the wording of the paragraphs of  the 
Guidance as if they were  legislation. It was strange to see Guidance given this kind of 
scrutiny, since it is clearly not written as legislation, and even stranger in a judicial 
review case, which one might have expected to focus rather more on the question of 
what might fairly have been expected from past practice as well as the guidance, 
rather than a detailed scrutiny of the precise wording. 
 
 
What is more, IR20 has now been replaced by HMRC 6 153
 
which seems to be written 
in terms that make even more effort than IR20 to avoid being binding.  It is not clear that these efforts to  prevent guidance from being something the taxpayer can rely on are conducive to the relationship of trust that HMRC is tying to create with taxpayers and the Court of Appeal in Gaines-Cooper seem to think is important  for the purposes of tax administration.  
 
The decision in Gaines-Cooper 
The Court of Appeal considered two different paragraphs of IR20. In one aprt of its 
decision it decided that  leaving the UK permanently or indefinitely could not be 
achieved  simply by satisfying the bright line tests in  paragraphs 2.7 to 2.9 of the  
Guidance involving absences for specified lengths of time as follows: 
“2.7 If you go abroad permanently, you will be treated as 
remaining resident and ordinarily resident if your visits to the 
UK average 91 days or more a year . . . . 
2.8 If you claim that you are no longer resident and ordinarily 
resident, we may ask you to give some evidence that you have 
left the UK permanently, or to live outside the UK for three 
                                                 
153 Available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/cnr/hmrc6.pdf 
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years or more. This evidence might be, for example, that you 
have taken steps to acquire accommodation abroad to live in as a 
permanent home, and if you continue to have property in the UK 
for your use, the reason is consistent with your stated aim of 
living abroad permanently or for three years or more. If you 
have left the UK permanently or for at least three years, you will 
be treated as resident and not ordinarily resident from the day 
after the date of your departure providing: 
a) Your absence from the UK has covered at least a whole tax 
year, and; 
b) Your visits to the UK since leaving: 
– have totalled less than 183 days in any tax year and; 
– have averaged less than 91 days a tax year. 
2.9 If you do not have this evidence, but you have gone abroad 
for a settled purpose (this would include a fixed object or 
intention in which you are going to be engaged for an extended 
period of time), you will be treated as not resident and not 
ordinarily resident from the day after the date of your departure 
providing: 
a) Your absence from the UK has covered at least a whole tax 
year and; 
b) Your visits to the UK since leaving: 
– have totalled less than 183 days in any tax year and; 
– have averaged less than 91 days a tax year . . . 
c) Your absence actually covers three years from your departure, 
or; 
d) Evidence becomes available to show that you have left the 
UK permanently; 
e) Providing in either case your visits to the UK since leaving 
have totalled less than 183 days in any tax year and have 
averaged less than 91 days a tax year.” 
 
Moses LJ explained that the dispute focused on whether, under these paragraphs, it 
was necessary for a taxpayer to demonstrate he had severed his ties to the extent 
that his previous social and family ties in the United Kingdom were no longer 
retained. The taxpayers argued that this did not arise on a proper construction of 
these paragraphs, and even if it did, this was not a construction applied by the 
Revenue until these cases provoked an unannounced change of policy. The Court 
held that because these paragraphs were headed “Leaving the UK permanently or 
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indefinitely” and in the light of the case law, it was necessary to demonstrate a 
distinct break from former social and family ties within the UK. One leading tax 
QC has described this interpretation of the Guidance as bizarre154 and it did 
surprise many. It could be supported by reference to the case law, but it is hard to 
see that it was apparent from the Guidance that this was a qualification of the tests 
as stated there. Nevertheless their Lordships held that the taxpayers fell outwith the 
circumstances which, would have gained them non-resident status under IR 20. 
Further they considered that there had not altered its interpretation but merely  
engaged in closer and more rigorous scrutiny and policing of the growing number 
of claims.155
 
.  
Thus this decision did not deal head on with the argument that  HMRC’s  
Guidance had involved an ultra vires  concession, because they did not interpret 
it to have contained any concession at all. Instead the Court of Appeal read into 
the Guidance the qualifications to make it consistent with the case law as HMRC 
now see it and as the Court agrees it should be read without the need for 
concession. This might be seen as an ingenious way of dealing with the problem, 
but it gives taxpayers very few signposts about the real value of HMRC 
Guidance despite the lip service to the possibility of it being binding on HMRC. 
It has been taken as giving some comfort to taxpayers that Moses LJ stated that “ 
the guidance in IR20 was plainly within the revenue’s powers of providing 
statements of practice and identifying how it proposed to deal with  the 
residential status of taxpayers in particular circumstances” but given that he 
considered that IR20 was merely intended to re-state the law this does not give 
any indication of how  far he would feel such guidance could go beyond he law, 
if at all. Moses LJ does cite Blake J in R (on the application of Lower Mill Estate 
Ltd and Conservation Builders) v HMRC 156
“the whole doctrine of legitimate expectation is of benefit, and 
only real value, where, on a true understanding of the facts and 
the law, the taxpayer is, or may well be, liable to tax. Despite 
that, however, it would be oppressive or unjust . . . to require 
him . . . to pay the tax because the conduct of the tax authorities, 
in the exercise of their management powers, has legitimately 
created the belief that tax would not be payable for a particular 
period, for a particular reason”.  
 who stated that  
 
This was dealt with, however, as part of the debate about an important procedural 
issue, not discussed further here, relating to the stage at which a judicial review 
application can be made. The contradiction of stating that HMRC must levy tax due 
and that they may also apply their own interpretation of the law in indeterminate cases 
such as this, where that interpretation may prove to be incorrect, or even deviate 
deliberately from the strict law in some cases, was left hanging in the air.  
 
                                                 
154 James Kessler QC.  Taxation of Foreign Domiciliaries draft of the 9th edition forthcoming 
September 2010- lectures based on book  available at 
http://www.kessler.co.uk/lectures/Residence_of_Individuals_lecture.pdf 
155 Ward LJ at para  121.  
156 2009] EWHC 2409 
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It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will also deal with this case without 
facing the most difficult issues head on. The case as it stands now certainly does 
illustrate the dangers of relying on the wording of HMRC guidance too literally and 
supports the concerns of the professional bodies about the Guidance on section16A. 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
 
Vesting a revenue authority with sufficient discretion to enable it to operate 
efficiently, whilst ensuring that there are processes in place to keep it in check, is not 
without difficulty. This balancing act takes place against the background of a more 
general constitutional and administrative law reality, adding a distinctive national 
flavour. In the third part of this paper we outlined the unique features of the UK 
constitution that form the background to the way in which the discretion of HMRC is 
assessed and controlled.  
 
The fourth and fifth part of this paper focused on a limited, yet crucial, set of 
discretions vested in the UK revenue authority that lie at the border of what may be 
termed quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions. Two case studies were 
considered, revealing a distinctive uncertainty over these discretions currently 
concerning the UK tax community, particularly regarding the use of non-statutory 
guidance of different types.  As the role of such guidance appears to be increasing in 
the UK system, the case for addressing some of these causes of uncertainty 
strengthens.  
 
The first area of concern regards the boundary of permissible interpretation. As seen, 
there is inevitably some uncertainty as to whether HMRC’s interpretations have 
strayed into the legislative or the concessionary area, given the indeterminacy of 
much tax law. There is therefore some lack of clarity as to which concessions and 
waivers are intra vires (that is within HMRC’s powers of management) and which are 
not under the Wilkinson principle.  
 
This is important because if guidance is found to be even partially concessionary or 
based on an incorrect view of the law, then questions arise on the extent to which 
taxpayers can rely on it in ordering their tax affairs. There is a clash here between the 
concept of illegality, which prevents HMRC from acting ultra vires, and judicial 
review based on legitimate expectations The driving concept in the latter area should 
be fairness, which leads to the basic premise that taxpayers ought to be able to rely on 
HMRC’s expressed interpretation of a statute of legislation, even if that involves 
some concessionary elements, for how are taxpayers to know whether these elements 
are ultra vires or not? As shown above, however, an expectation can only be 
legitimate if it is founded on a lawful act or interpretation. This is logical but raises 
real issues of the extent to which judicial review can achieve fairness for the 
individual. Criticisms of this principle from the courts and commentators suggests 
that the principle may be softened, but this involves a modification of  the law of 
judicial review.  
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Uncertainties currently also surrounds the extent to which HMRC can shuffle off the 
constraints of guidance by the simple expedient of a general caveat, in which case it is 
substantially devalued for many ordinary taxpayers of the kind for whom it is 
intended to increase and not create lack of clarity. Further there is a difficult line 
between the increase of policing and enforcement and a change in interpretation. The 
extent to which a taxpayer need have relied or indeed suffered a detriment by relying 
on the guidance is also a grey area in judicial review proceedings.  
 
No easy solution lies for some of these issues and, where they are bound up with the 
development of the law of judicial review more generally they may take some time to 
be decided and they may be determined in non-revenue law cases, which could give 
rise to rather different considerations. One way forward would be for all concessions 
and guidance to have a statutory basis. Indeed, many concessions are now in the 
process of being enacted following Wilkinson. Clearly it is preferable to deal with 
issues through properly drafted legislation wherever possible, but this counsel of 
perfection does not allow for the realities of a complex system that needs some 
administrative discretion if it is not to seize up altogether.  
 
Where guidance is concerned, some might prefer precise and detailed drafting but this 
has shown itself to be inadequate and to create opportunities for avoidance by 
encouraging creative compliance. Guidance therefore has a role to play along side 
legislation founded on principles, but if it is to be used taxpayers must know what its 
effect is to be. Judicial review raises procedural difficulties and is time consuming 
and expensive. It has been suggested that a specific statutory right of action on 
grounds of unfairness should be created to be available against the HMRC in 
connection with extra-statutory guidance.157
 
 This might be worth exploring, although 
it would no doubt encounter many of the same issues as have been discussed here. 
Improving the judicial review procedure and clarifying its application would 
obviously be valuable and it is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will seize the 
opportunity in the Gaines -Cooper case since direction is badly needed.  
Some improvements could be made by means of a few relatively simple steps. For a 
start, there should be a clear scheme of documentation in which HMRC lays out its 
interpretations and guidance. Currently they are to be found in various forms and 
locations as described in Part 2 above.  The documentation should be easy to find and 
download, and it is imperative that this extends to past versions too. Currently 
practice statements and manuals can change overnight and without any trace of the 
previous version.  158
                                                 
157 A. Rowland,  “Is the Revenue Being Fair? Revenue Statements and Judicial Review”, 1995 BTR 
115. This was written a long time before some of the recent developments in the law of judicial review.  
 Blanket caveats ought not to be employed or allowed. Stating 
that guidance does not apply if there is perceived tax avoidance essentially translates 
into HMRC being at liberty to decide whether to follow their guidance or not, thus 
negating the guidance of any utility. Finally, HMRC ought to be clear on the face of 
the document whether it considers the contents of guidance to be interpretative or 
concessionary. Further, any changes to guidance and its implementation should take 
effect only after a certain time period and with proper notice.  These requirements 
158 In one case, R (on the appn of Thompson) v Fletcher [2002] STC 1149, the Tribunal noted that the 
parties could not reconstitute the guidance for the time the transaction took place as a result of this. 
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could be spelt out in the HMRC Charter159
 
 and this might give this document some of 
the teeth it currently lacks. 
Whilst better drafting of legislation which would reduce the need for guidance and 
concessions should not be abandoned as an aim, precision in tax law is unattainable in 
the real world. These modest proposals would not solve all the difficult questions 
raised, but they would constitute a small step in the right direction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
159  See fn 3 above.   
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